Ayn Rand predicted this 50 years ago. The producers need to stop supporting the fiction and allow it to crash.
Those of us who lived thru the 50s remember that with 'Dad' being the sole worker (for the ladies, outside of the house) could go to work and support a family of five, pay for a house, save money, buy a car every 4 to 5 years, etc.
That same life style, today, now requires two workers outside of the house.
The American dollar should come on rolls so that we have a choice we can spend it or use it to wipe our butts.
Jim
AP, the 50's were significantly more complicated then that. At the end of WWII, the industrial capacity of the entire rest of the world was in ruins. Europe was devistated, Japan was burned to the ground, and Stalin decided the Soviets should ignore the production of items for consumer production, and focus on military production. So, for the next 15 years, America was the only game in town. During the 1950's we were responsible for 80% of the worlds industrial production. However, after the post-war Asian and Europen economies rebuilt, our share of world industrial production returned to a more normal level.
The 1950's represented a huge "windfall profit" for the US. IMO who SHOULD have preserved the capital to maximize our realitive competative advantage for the decades to come, but as Hatari noted, we squandered it on the "war against poverty" and wrecked the Brenton-Woods Gold/Dollar standard. We began to believe we, as a nation, were entitled to the easy prosperity of the 1950's. As a result we weren't really prepared for the inflation, oil embargo's, and international competative pressures of the 1970's.
In the mean time, our University's were taken over by the draft dodging neo-pacifist socialist liberals. While the conservatives were doing their duty in the jungles of South Vietnam, the liberals were getting student deferments for the duration of the was. Ten years was just right for them to get PHD's and take over the University administration, and alter the course of American thought.
On the regulation of Banks:
1776 was a very important year, for it was then that Adam Smith published his inquiry into the nature and cause of The Wealth of Nations. In it he lays out the few area where regulation is necessary to facilitate commerce, and in this short list, he includes Bank, for it is only when the banking system can be trusted that commerce can flow with the minimum of worry.
To some degree, banks in this country have always been regulated, and that was still true during the melt down of 07/08. Regulation in, and of it self, is not always good, and much of the regulation actually destroyed the free market aspects of one of our largest financial markets, home mortgages. In a true free market, every bank would set their own lending standard, but we'd evolved to a system where all standards were esentially set by psudo govermental orginizations, Freddie and Fannie. This concentration of decision making killed one of the necessary checks and balances in a free market system. Banks were being forced to provide high risk loans at insufficent interest rates, and it didn't take banks long to realize the risk was not worth the reward. Now the CMO was nothing new, they've been around since the early 1980's. What was new was the bank desire not to hold the risk for these new loans, and make their money on a transaction, vs a lending basis.
So let's be clear, it was regulation that created the incentive to off load these loans and the bad risk reward potential. But in order to find buyers for these loans, it was necessary for investors to believe they were less likely then they really were. This was the result of inflated rating by the RATING AGENCIES, S&P, Moodies, Fitches. Although the rating agencies were regulated, their regulation was all wrong. In reality, there regulation served as little more then a barrier to entry, preventing new agencies from entering the business, which would allow a wider more diverse range of idea's and create a freer market. Perhaps even more importantly, the Rating Agencies bore no responsiblility for getting it right. If they rated a company AAA on monday, and it went belly up on tuesday, it was the investor left holding the bag, and the agency could not be held liable. In addition, the agencies are paid by the company who's securities they are rating. This created a game, where if a batch of securies could not achieve the AAA status, the agencies would "consult" with the underwriters, for a "fee" (read bribe) to help them increase the ratings. Finally reality set in, and the lie collapsed. In one day, S&P reduced the rating on a group of securities 17 levels from AAA (what the US governemnt SHOULD be) to junk status......all in one day....now does anyone really believe the fundamental of these securites changed that much in one day??? This brought into question the rating of all similar securities, and the short term money markets froze, and the crisis was on. As an interesting side not, not one person from any rating agency has served a single day in jail for their role in the immense fraud they perpertrated upon the peoples of this world.
Lets be clear the rating agencies were wrongly regulated creating perverse incentives When we discuss derivitives and the collapse, people tend to focus on the banks. On the whole banks used derivities to off load much of their risk, but there in another catagory of financial institution that used them to do the opposite, INSURANCE COMPANIES. In this instance
the regulation failed to keep up with the pace of the industry . Let me show you what I mean. The largest financial company to go bankrupt in all this was AIG, not a bank, but an insurance company. Just like how banks are required to keep an amount of reserves against the money they loan, insurance companies are required to maintain reserves against the amount of insurance in force. Insuring bonds was nothing new, but what AIG discovered was AIG discovered was that performed the function of insuring bonds, but did so as a "defalt swap" instead of an insurance contract, they could bypass the reserve requirements. This allowed them to leverage the company to a level unimagined by the regulators, and even if they could imagine it, there was nothing they could do, because they were not insurance products. This sytem was again the result of perverse incentives created by the "hit and run" form of compensation called "stock options". The way it was played was for exec to run up the price of their stock as their options matured, increasing their personal profits. This was accomplished by increasing the companies leverage, and hence it's vulnerabilty to market down turns. Their system worked great in an increasing market, but once the credit markets froze, AIG was toast. If you study the origins of executive stock options, you will see they are rooted in their favorable tax status, so once again, it was bad regulation, creating bad incentives, that contributed to the collapse.
In summary, it wasn't the lack of regulation, it was BAD REGULATION that set in motion the financial crisis of 2008.