Home Forums Miscellaneous Topics Military Thoughts on operational courage of the Japanese Navy, WWII

Arrogant and overreaching is exactly it.

Also, to be fair to Kimmel from a threat assessment standpoint, Pearl was not considered to be much of a threat. The majority of threat focus was rightfully on the Philippines, not on Pearl. The attack on Pearl Harbor was nearly as unprecedented as 9/11�Easy to Monday morning quarterback, but very difficult to figure in the moment. I too think Kimmel got a bit of a raw deal.

No one outside of the military had ever heard of Kimmel prior to Dec 7th, while McCarthur was very well known inside and outside of the military. I think that had allot to do with his treatement as opposed to Kimmel�s. Some �fall-guys� were needed after the attacks and Kimmel was a much easier/safer target than McCarthur was.

Funniest line I have ever read came from McCarthur regarding Dwight Esinhower�s abilities to be a good president. When McCarthur was asked this question he smirked and said: �Dwight was one of the best clerks I ever had so he should do fine.�

It would be interesting to imagine how McArthur would have fared as Supreme Allied Commander in the ETO. Can you picture him "dealing" with Patton, Montgomery and De Gaulle? I'm thinking instead of a more or less united Allied effort against the Germans we might have had at least 4 separate wars going on at once.

War is one of those endeavors where it should be mandatory that all political leaders and military commanders check their egos and personal agendas at the door...but that ain�t ever gonna happen.

Inter service battles within a countries own military are bad enough, but when you toss in a few �allies� that have to be appeased, catered to, and dealt with you really start walking a tight rope.

Esenhower was not a �warrior� (he had never been in combat or commanded troops) he was a politician, and perhaps that what was needed for that job.

Eisenhower was precisely the right man in the right position at the right time. He kept it all together when everyone else was trying to pull it all apart.

The ego thing is a two sided blade. Ego ruined Patton�s career and cowing to the ego of Montgomery brought about Market Garden. But generally speaking, the more egotistical the general, the more competent he is. Ego just goes with the territory and has to be managed. Several times during gulf war v.1.0 Schwarzkopf had to be reigned in, and at one time, Colon Powell just about fired him over his ego. But the man was good, few could argue that.

"Just because you're a megalomaniac doesn't mean you can't do what you say you can."

Caesar, Napolean, Patton, a certain Alaskan logger, my first employer (who was a classic megalomaniac albeit a total crook and highly successful millionaire) etc., etc.

All successful people have an �ego�...but when it becomes the primary focus of your decision making process it can have very bad consequences...especially for the people working for you whose lives may depend on your decisions.

The Imperial Japanese Navy pretty much lost the War before sailing to Hawaii. You all forget that it was the Code breakers, we have a long tradition of reading peoples mail. Knowing what they were going to do or not do at the operational level assured that Japan would not win, same for Germany. It was the Information Battle that the Allies won early on and well the rest is history. They depended on a quick fight, America would leave the pacific and all would be well for the take over of the Asian land mass. Japan did not have the resorces for a long war, and American Blocking Actions in the first six months foiled them, and by June 5 we when from defence to offence. It all turned on a dime because of some good math guys in a room in the basment of the Department of the Navy.

one factor in the TAFFY 3 battle not mentioned was the JAPS had heard the clear radio meassage sent without code by taffy 3 to the main fleet for help and fully expected (INCORRECTLY) to be engaged with the full force of the fast battleships and cruisers they THOUGHT were only a hour or so away at best from the carriers they tTHOUGHT those ships were guarding, keep in mind they THOUGHT that th destroyer screen they engauged were only the outer edge of the fleets defensive formation and could clearly read that call for help to the main battle fleet which THEY thought was divided between those chasing the northern DECOY jap CARRIERS and the BATTLESHIPS THEY THOUGHT were guarding the beaches/landings

340mag brings up very good points. As I had said earlier, fighting Naval battles in the 1940�s wasn�t like it is today where we have ways of accurately pin-pointing enemy ships. Back then anything over the horizon was pretty safe from detection, and in most cases both sides were only making educated guesses as to where each others ships actually were.

Unlike their planes and pilots, the Japanese didn�t have the luxury of having �throw-away� ships and they had to protect what they had just like we did.

Yes but...

The fast battleships were supposed to be chasing the decoy fleet, and in fact they were. Up till now things are going (sort of) according to plan. Halsey took the bait, the southern fleet failed to follow thru, running from ships that were not there.
They choked! Good thing too, my Grandfather was ferrying Marines to the beach about then and my dad was yet unborn, heck the Japs coulda killed me two generations ago.

Screw ups and miscalculations are always going to occur in a war. The trick is to minimize yours and capitalize on your enemies. Like they say...no battle plan has ever survived the first round being fired.

I have read that the US Navy under Kimmel wasn't responsible for providing air defense. Hawaiian air defense on 12/07/1941 was the responsibility of the US Army Air Corps under Short. The lack of a unified command allowed the ball to be dropped. I have also read that neither Kimmel, nor Short, had access to the information from the coded Japanese communications that the Navy�s ONI and the Army�s MI were reading. Again, the lack of a central authority for intelligence allowed opportunities to be missed.

I understand that McArthur�s original plan to defend the Philippines was to stockpile several months of supplies on Bataan Peninsula and to be build a defense in depth. Late in the game, McA decided to defend against the Japanese at the landing beaches even though he lacked air power, artillery, armor, and trained soldiers. Also, the USN submarine forces in the Philippines were employed hauling gold and US dollars out of Japan�s reach, rather than shooting torpedoes at the Japanese landing forces. Of course, once the Japanese bombed the Civite Naval Base, there might not have been replacement torpedoes or a means to load them into the submarines, so the effort might not have been worth the risk.

Jeff

Luckily for all of us we learned from our early mistakes and incompetence and sprang back faster than Japan could handle.

Naval aircraft has traditionally been used for defending the Fleet while at sea and providing close air support for Marine landing forces. The vast majority of the Navy planes were sitting on the decks of the carriers that weren�t at Pearl Harbor during the attack.

Now...if they had just listened to Billy Mitchell 20 years earlier things might have been different.

Pearl Harbor was a puric victory for the Japanese, they Sank or damaged 21 ships of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet, 18 of them would be refloated, repaired and returnd to service. The Japanese did have Courage and a lot of it, so much so it clouded judgement at the highest levels of their command. Operationally they should have looked for a way out after New Guinea or Coral Sea, and they should have asked what was required after Midway, it would have cost the Japanese a whole lot less. All they would have had to do was to leave China, that was a loosing deal for them anyway. Hind sight as they aways say is 20/20. In the end it really dose not matter things turned out the way the turned out. The pacific war was a tough long fight, just as this current one. I think that there was more of a Will to close with the enemy then. How this current one is going to pan out is anybodys guess.

I�ve often wondered how different the war in the Pacific might have turned out had it been our carriers sitting in Pearl Harbor and being destroyed/damaged and the Battleships had been out of harms way that day?

I think we would have had allot harder time �bouncing� back.

Pure speculation, but in that reversal, I think the Japanese carrier planes would have finished the job by sinking our battleships at Midway, since those would have been all we had to send there.

Or not - could be the fleets never would have found each other, the Japs would have bombed the crap out of Midway virtually unopposed and then landed and taken it.

Either way the Japanese would still have had their carriers to harass and interdict our attempts in the Solomons, etc. etc. Or we would have had to wait until we built new carriers before trying any island landings.

I think we would have won eventually since it was a war of attrition after all, but there would have been lots of ripple effects that would not have been good for us, that's for sure.

What if's are fun, but we should all thank our lucky stars that the Japanese DID miss our carriers at Pearl, and that we fortunately did find their carriers at Midway and by sheer luck on our part and a bad decision on their part, that our dive bombers arrived when their carrier decks were loaded with planes being re-armed.

Lots of places where history swung on one lucky (or unlucky) happenstance.