Was it a big a supperze as we're told?

Was it a big a supperze as we're told?

I've been told FDR was onto it?

I've been told FDR was onto it?

Different times…my father was 17 and so pissed that my grandmother made him finish high school before enlisting. He was youngest of three. The oldest went Army and the other two Navy.
My godfather was in the USAAF. When, as a kid, I asked him, “What did you do in the war Uncle Richard?” he’d just say, “Oh, I was just a test pilot.” After he and my aunt were both gone and I was left with all their stuff to go through and sort out I learned he’d been an a number of major air battles and was highly decorated. He was a squadron maintenance officer so I assume he probably would test flight stuff they worked on, thus “..just a test pilot.” A far cry from all today’s REMFs turned Rambos in their reminiscences.

I've been told FDR was onto it?

They were humble about their accomplishments.
That is a big part of what made them the Greatest Generation.

By Fred L. Schultz
February 2004
Naval History Magazine
Volume 18, Number 1


Michael Gannon presented “new evidence” in support of the Pearl Harbor commanders recently at the National Press Club, but political expedience may be the factor that tips the scale...

The Kimmel family and its supporters refuse to surrender. On 6 November 2003, the only living son and three grandsons of Husband Kimmel staged a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. The event sustained their efforts to persuade the President of the United States to issue a proclamation, posthumously nominating Kimmel and Walter Short, respectively the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army commanders during the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, for retirement at their highest wartime ranks—Admiral and Lieutenant General—under the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

According to Admiral Kimmel's son, Edward R. "Ned" Kimmel, supporters of this effort "are at war with the Department of Defense." After what he refers to as being "stonewalled at every turn" by the bureaucracy in the Pentagon (and in the White House, including a snubbing from Chief of Staff Andrew Card), he said, "I am now seeking assistance from the Press."

As part of the Armed Forces Spending Authorization Act of 2001, both houses of Congress voted unanimously in September 2000 to exonerate Admiral Kimmel and General Short and to ask the President for the elusive restoration of rank. But congressional action apparently is not enough. When asked exactly what the family and its advocates are seeking, grandson Manning M. Kimmel IV replied, "It's real simple. We need one sentence from the Commander-in-Chief."

Grandson Thomas K. Kimmel Jr. drew a parallel between the numerous Pearl Harbor investigations and the Kean Commission's current investigation of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. "You might call the comparison tenuous," he said. "Actually, the parallel is frightening. . . . [B]y declining to determine true accountability for the disaster at Pearl Harbor, an entire parade of administrations may have laid the groundwork for the success of the 9/11 attack. . . . And now, those same dynamics, which block accountability for the 9/11 disaster, may unwittingly lay the foundation for the next attack." In fact, Admiral Kimmel's son Ned volunteered to testify before the Kean Commission after reading about Chairman Thomas H. Kean's wish for more success than the "much criticized panels created after the bombing of Pearl Harbor."

The featured speaker was Dr. Michael Gannon, Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of History from the University of Florida and a respected World War II historian, who presented "new evidence" that Kimmel and Short supporters claim bolsters their case. One of the key pieces of information, according to Gannon, comes from recently discovered documents indicating official Navy knowledge that the Japanese had developed successful shallow-water torpedoes, a fact never passed on to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

The second key element in what the Kimmel family calls the vindication "smoking gun" points to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King's charge of dereliction of duty in 1944, based on Admiral Kimmel's choice of sectors in which long-range aerial reconnaissance would be conducted. Some sectors had been identified as "more dangerous," according to Admiral King, and Admiral Kimmel chose the wrong ones. But Gannon says that "recent research" (the basis of which he acknowledged using for a December 1994 article in the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings) indicates no such "more dangerous" list. Furthermore, Admiral Kimmel did not have sufficient numbers of patrol aircraft (49 PBY Catalinas) to conduct full-range surveillance over any one sector for more than four or five days. "Thus," said Gannon, "if following the so-called 'war warning' of 27 November Kimmel had thrown all his patrol aircraft into a single-sector search, the entire force would be down for repair or overhaul by 2 December, leaving the balance of days prior to 7 December unattended."


Had the shallow-water torpedo information not been withheld from Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, said Gannon, "alarm bells would have sounded insistently in Kimmel's staff offices. But the knowledge was deep-sixed until found by a researcher 60 years later. Where now is the dereliction?"

According to the Kimmel family and retired Naval Reserve Captain Vincent J. Colan, the matter remains mired in the Department of Defense, apparently in the office of Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, David S. C. Chu. The department allegedly has drafted two memoranda: a "Do" recommendation, with evidence to support the restoration of rank, and a "Don't" recommendation, with arguments against such an action. Efforts by Captain Colan to obtain copies of their contents have thus far proved futile.

"It's totally political," said former Chief of Naval Operations retired Admiral James Holloway. "We have to find a way that the President could make this judgment and politically benefit from it." As of press time, neither the Department of Defense nor the White House has made a further move on what has become known as "The Kimmel Case."

Published: Dec. 3, 2016 at 11:25 PM CST|Updated: Jan. 9, 2018 at 1:18 PM CST

HENDERSON, KY (WFIE) - December 7, 1941, is a day that has changed the course of the Kimmel family's life.

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, originally from Henderson, oversaw the U.S. forces during the surprise attacks by the Japanese imperial navy at Pearl Harbor.

"This is the first time I've seen my grandfather, a likeness of him when he was alive and that was 50 years ago almost," said Kimmel's grandson, Manning.

Someone had to take the fall for those attacks.

"He was wrongly blamed for the success of that attack and the devastation of the American men there."

Admiral Kimmel was singled out, being relived of his command and demoted from a four-star rank to two stars.

He was cleared of any failures in 1944 but didn't have his rank restored even after his death in 1968. That left his grandchildren, Manning and Thomas Kimmel, to continue the fight in the form of a statue, erected on the Henderson riverfront.

They say if Admiral Kimmel saw this statue today, he would only view it as a glorious exercise.

"He would, though, encourage to the sky, our effort to get the full Pearl Harbor story to the public," says Kimmel's grandson Thomas. "The reality is that admiral Kimmel and the men under his command were grossly let down by military men and political officials in Washington D.C."

On December 7, they will bow their heads for the 2,500 dead servicemen and women.

The only way a general can have his rank restored is if he gets an official pardon from the president himself.

Copyright 2016 WFIE. All rights reserved.

The Pearl Harbor attack launched many official investigations. Blame has been spread from on-scene military commanders to President Roosevelt himself.

By Peter Grier Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

December 10, 2009 | Washington

Days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox arrived in Hawaii. He'd been sent by President Roosevelt himself, with simple instructions: find out what happened, and how.

On December 16, Secretary Knox – a former journalist – issued a report that was full of vivid tales of US heroism to a still-grieving nation. He talked about the battleship captain who had refused to be evacuated from the burning bridge of his ship; the motor launch skipper who pulled those blown overboard from the flames of the burning harbor; and the mechanics who pulled machine guns from burning planes, and fired back.

Knox's secret report to FDR was more bracing. It counted up US losses and noted that US forces had been taken completely by surprise.

"Neither the Army nor the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely," Knox wrote privately.

Investigations began immediately

In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, investigations began immediately. In some ways, they continue today, as historians, journalists, and ordinary citizens debate the meaning and causes of what remains, despite September 11, the most shocking surprise attack in the nation's history.

Knox's trip was the first official probe. His public comments minimized the damage, so as not to give information away to the Japanese. His secret findings emphasized, among other things, the "meticulous detail" of the Japanese military's plans of attack, and "their courage, ability, and resourcefulness".

Knox's report caused FDR to order a commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, to carry out a more thorough look at the attack's circumstances.

The Roberts Commission report, issued in December, 1942, exonerated major political figures in Washington, and laid much of the blame for ill-preparedness on the top commanders on scene in Hawaii: Army General Walter Short and Admiral Husband Kimmel. Both were demoted, and both retired from the military within months.

Subsequent investigations began to spread blame for the debacle more widely. Six more probes were held during the war years, counting separate efforts from the Army and Navy, and associated spin-offs.

For instance, a Naval Board of Inquiry held in 1944 blamed Admiral Harold Stark, chief of naval operations at the time of Pearl Harbor, for not adequately advising Kimmel of the critical situation between the US and Japan in the weeks prior to the attack.

Wartime secrecy needed

All these investigations were hampered in some manner by the need to maintain wartime secrecy, particularly in regards to US code-breaking efforts.

At war's end the US Congress launched a final, thorough investigation of Pearl Harbor that included a review of all relevant classified documents, including translations of intercepted and decoded Japanese messages. This Joint Congressional Committee effort issued a 40-volume report in mid-1946.

Blame all around

In this report, blame for the disaster was laid at the feet of everyone from Secretary of War Henry Stimson to commanders on scene. A minority annex censured the behavior of President Roosevelt, as well.

In sum, the Congressional committee found that Washington-based officials failed to give proper notice to a series of intercepted messages from Tokyo to its consulate in Honolulu that indicated keen interest in the harbor berthing plan and other dispositions of the US fleet.

Nor did Washington react quickly enough to the "one o'clock message" – the last of a 14-part message series sent from Tokyo to Japanese diplomats in Washington – the congressional probe found. This message ordered the destruction of code books and indicated that hostilities of some sort would begin at 1 pm, Eastern Standard Time.

"If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information," concluded the Joint Committee report.

In the decades since the war's end, family members and proponents of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel have pushed to overturn the general conclusion that the two on-scene commanders should shoulder the burden of the blame.

In 1999, the Senate passed a non-binding resolution exonerating both Kimmel and Short, and asking President Clinton to posthumously restore their ranks. Clinton did not respond. President Bush similarly declined to take such an action.

Revisionists blame FDR

Revisionists have long pushed the notion that a true examination of the evidence would show the FDR knew the attack was to occur and that he allowed it in order to rouse the nation for participation in the war.

For instance, the 1999 book "Day of Deceit", by Robert Stinnett, held that FDR's effort to provoke Japan into war was a principal policy of his administration throughout 1941. FDR must have known that war was imminent from intercepted messages, according to Stinnett. Nor did the Japanese fleet maintain strict radio silence as it steamed towards Hawaii.

But the mere existence of such information does not indicate that it was speedily understood and used, noted the New York Times in its 1999 review of Stinnett's book.

It may be disturbing in hindsight to see that commanders in Hawaii weren't told of all that was contained in the intercepted messages, but "that failure by itself does not prove Mr. Stinnett's contention of a conspiracy to deprive commanders of the information they needed," wrote reviewer Richard Bernstein.

If Pearl Harbor had not have happened then America might not have joined the war and all of Europe would be speaking German now.

I've been told FDR was onto it?

You had TWO chances prior to bring up your horseshit on TWO Dec7 threads you started last week.
Piss off moron

I think the conspiracy theory thread is two doors down.

I kinda had the remembrance of Americans and servicemen who died in mind.

The country we live in is not the same one that was attacked that day.

Brave Men, may they all rest in piece.

...1941

Bill Hall, our school principal, is a WW2 Navy veteran. He drove landing crafts.

When you put sanctions on a country and blockade it bad stuff happens. Just as Lincoln forced the civil war Roosevelt pushed Japan into desperation.

I think the conspiracy theory thread is two doors down.

I kinda had the remembrance of Americans and servicemen who died in mind.

The country we live in is not the same one that was attacked that day.

Navy Authenticates Keel for Future USS Arizona (SSN 803)

07 December 2022

WASHINGTON – Senior Navy leaders, elected officials, and industry partners gathered at General Dynamics Electric Boat’s Quonset Point Facility, Dec. 7, to attend a keel-authentication ceremony for future Virginia-class submarine USS Arizona (SSN 803).


The submarine will be the first U.S. naval vessel to bear the name Arizona since battleship USS Arizona (BB 39) was sunk during the attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. After being struck with several bombs, Arizona burned for two days and more than 1100 of her crew were lost. The lives lost during the attack are now permanently memorialized by the USS Arizona Memorial, erected over her sunken hull in the berth she has occupied since that historic day.



“The boats in this class are the most advanced attack submarines ever designed. Their stealth, firepower, and maneuverability are superior to every other attack submarine force in the world. Additionally, Arizona will be the first of the Virginia-class equipped with the Virginia Payload Module, enabling the submarine to deliver an even wider variety of capabilities,” said Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Office, Attack Submarines. “Building, operating and maintaining Arizona and other Virginia-class subs is crucial to ensuring the Navy’s ability to project power in an ever-shifting global threat environment, and to maintaining peace and the free operation of our sea lanes.”



The ship’s sponsor, Nikki Stratton, is the granddaughter of Donald Stratton, who was serving as a Seaman First Class aboard Arizona during the 1941 attack. Badly burned, he was discharged in 1942, but successfully reenlisted in 1944 and returned to the Western Pacific serving aboard destroyer USS Stack (DD-406) to fight in New Guinea, the Philippines and the Battle of Okinawa. Stratton spent the remainder of his life helping honor those who gave their lives during the attack on Pearl Harbor and other battles. He died at the age of 97, in February 2020.



Per Navy tradition, the ship’s sponsor’s initials were welded onto a steel plate to be permanently mounted in a place of honor on the completed vessel.



Arizona will be the 30th Virginia-class submarine. Boats in this class can hit shore-based targets with highly accurate Tomahawk cruise missiles and are capable of long-term, stealth surveillance of sea forces, littoral waters or ground targets. Their design also provides for Special Forces delivery and support, mine delivery and minefield mapping, and anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare.



Arizona’s Virginia Payload Module will comprise four large-diameter, vertical payload tubes in a new hull section inserted into the existing Virginia-class submarine design. The tubes enable the submarine to deliver a variety of capabilities, including weapons, unmanned undersea vehicles, and other undersea payloads.



For more information about Virginia-class attack submarines, visit http://www.navy.mil/local/virginiaclass/



For more news from the Navy, visit www.navy.mil

Japanese preparations for the invasion of the Philippines

By 6 December 1941 (Hawaii time), the Japanese had assembled about five hundred fighters and bombers at airbases on Formosa (now Taiwan) for their assault on the Philippines. The task of this huge fleet of Japanese aircraft was to support a seaborne invasion by destroying the United States Far East Air Force, and seizing control of the skies over the Philippines for Japan.

The Japanese were not expecting to be able to employ their standard tactic of a swift surprise attack for their invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would take place at 8.00 a.m. on 7 December 1941 (Hawaii time). However, because of the difference in time zones, and the separation of Hawaii and the Philippines by the International Date Line, at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor it would be 2.30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 in Manila. The Japanese had planned for their bombers and fighters to begin taking off from Formosan airbases at 2.30 am on 8 December. This timing would enable the Japanese aircraft to reach the Philippines by daybreak on that same day. By that time, the Japanese expected that the commander of American air forces on the Philippines (MacArthur) would have responded to their attack on Pearl Harbor by placing his air defences on full war alert. The Japanese expected that their fighters and bombers would meet stiff opposition from American fighters when they arrived over the Philippines.



MacArthur thought that the new American B-17D heavy bomber (above) could prevent a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Unfortunately, his inaction during the nine hours following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor caused his air power to be destroyed on the ground.

Before Japanese aircraft could take off from Formosa at 2.30 a.m. on 8 December, thick fog began to envelop the airbases. As hours passed with no sign of the fog lifting, senior Japanese commanders and their staff became increasingly concerned that the Americans might strike first at the Formosan airbases which were crowded with aircraft, fully armed, fuelled, and waiting to take off. They need not have worried. In the Philippines, General MacArthur had neglected to place his command on a full war footing even after learning about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese Attack on the Philippines

MacArthur's inaction and failure to follow war orders causes the loss of American air power in the Philippines

Within minutes of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred at about 2.30 a.m. on 8 December 1941 (Manila time), the news was received at the headquarters of the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. Admiral Hart was informed at about 3.00 a.m. The news was not passed on to the army. Shortly after 3.00 a.m. on that morning, General MacArthur was informed of the Japanese attack by his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland. An army signalman had picked up the news while listening to a Californian radio station. At 3.40 a.m., Brigadier Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the Army's War Plans Division, telephoned MacArthur from Washington to confirm that Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. He told MacArthur that he "wouldn't be surprised if you get an attack there in the near future". [1]

The commander of MacArthur's Far East Air Force, Major General Lewis Brereton, heard the news about Pearl Harbor from Brigadier General Sutherland shortly before 4.00 a.m. Brereton immediately placed MacArthur's only powerful offensive weapon on war alert. Many of his fliers had only just returned to their airbases from the lavish party at MacArthur's hotel.

It is at this point, that MacArthur's headquarters at Manila takes on the characteristics of a chapter from Alice in Wonderland. History records that the Japanese launched devastating attacks on MacArthur's airbases at about 12.20 p.m. on 8 December 1941. Instead of acting decisively to prepare for a likely Japanese attack on the Philippines, MacArthur took no significant action between 3.00 a.m. and 12.20 p.m. to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist an attack and to preserve his air force. Whether MacArthur's paralysis during these critical nine hours was due to indecision or the restraining influence of President Quezon, or perhaps a combination of both, has never been satisfactorily explained by historians. From 5.00 a.m. on the morning of 8 December 1941, Major General Brereton tried to speak to MacArthur about a Far East Air Force response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but he was repeatedly denied access to MacArthur by Brigadier General Sutherland.

At 5.30 a.m. on this morning, MacArthur received a cable from Washington directing him to execute the Rainbow -5 war plan at once. [2] It will be recalled from the preceding chapter, that Washington had amended the Rainbow -5 war plan on 19 November 1941 to include orders for the planes of the Far East Air Force stationed in the Philippines to attack any Japanese forces and installations within range at the outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese airbases and harbour installations on Formosa were within range of MacArthur's B-17s. Two of the most extraordinary aspects of this morning were (a) the failure by MacArthur to contact and confer with the commander of his Far East Air Force between 5.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m., and (b) MacArthur's failure to obey both the amended Rainbow 5 war plan and the war order transmitted from Washington at 5.30 a.m.

Major General Brereton was aware of the Japanese propensity to launch surprise attacks at dawn, and he wanted to persuade MacArthur to mount a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases on Formosa. While waiting to see MacArthur on this morning, Brereton was informed by Admiral Hart that Japanese carrier aircraft had bombed the American seaplane tender William B. Preston in Davao Bay on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. This was clearly a hostile "first overt act" by Japan of the kind referred to in General Marshall's war warning of 27 November 1941. In response to this direct hostile act against an American warship in Philippine waters, Brereton again asked Sutherland to permit him to see MacArthur or approve bombing of the Japanese airbases on Formosa himself. Sutherland refused both requests.

Fearing that his aircraft would be caught on the ground by the Japanese and destroyed, Brereton finally ordered them aloft to circle their airfields. Shortly after 9.00 a.m., Brereton was told that Japanese aircraft had attacked southern Luzon, and he pressed Sutherland again for permission to attack the Japanese airbases on Formosa. Again Sutherland refused. It was not until 11.00 a.m. that MacArthur finally approved a bombing attack on the Japanese airbases. Brereton ordered all of his aircraft to land so that they could be refuelled and the bombers armed.

As a direct result of MacArthur's inexcusable failure to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist a likely Japanese attack, most of Brereton's aircraft were sitting on their airstrips when Japanese bombers and fighters arrived overhead at about 12.20 p.m. on 8 December and took them by surprise.

Reflecting the slackness of MacArthur's command structure, radar and other warnings of the approach of unidentified aircraft formations had not been passed on to flight commanders at American airbases. At the Clark Field airbase, located about 50 miles (80 km) north of Manila, the American bombers and fighters were caught on the ground and most were destroyed. Other Japanese aircraft attacked the American fighter airbase at Iba on the west coast of the main northern island of Luzon and destroyed all but two of the American P-40 fighters based there. Half of the aircraft of MacArthur's Far East Air Force were destroyed on the ground on the first day of the Japanese attack. In the following week, continuing Japanese air attacks reduced Brereton's remaining aircraft to a handful of P-40 fighters and a handful of B-17 bombers. Realising that there were not enough fighters left to protect the B-17 bombers, MacArthur ordered Brereton and his staff to take the B-17s to the safety of Australia.

It has been difficult for historians to establish the reason for MacArthur's fatal inaction during the crucial nine hours that elapsed in Manila following news of the Pearl Harbor attack. There was no American government inquiry into MacArthur's behaviour of the kind that addressed alleged failures of command at Pearl Harbor. When informally questioned after the war, the chief actors in the Philippines disaster appeared to be concerned to protect their own reputations by shifting blame to others.

MacArthur's failure to respond appropriately to the emergency was almost certainly influenced by Philippine politics. The President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon, had been a friend of MacArthur for many years. Despite the Philippines already having been included, without its consent, in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Quezon naively believed that his country was neither militarily or economically important to Japan. In pursuance of this fantasy, Quezon had hoped to steer the Philippines to a course of neutrality in the event of war between the United States and Japan. When Quezon received news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he contacted MacArthur immediately to urge him to avoid action that might provoke a Japanese attack on the Philippines. Quezon's pressure for neutrality was reflected in the orders issued by MacArthur immediately following the news of Pearl Harbor. Although ordering his army and air forces to battle stations, MacArthur directed that the American Army and Air Force in the Philippines was not to initiate offensive action against Japan. The American Far East Air Force was permitted by MacArthur to retaliate only if directly attacked by the Japanese.

Quezon's pressure for neutrality appears to have infected the decision-making process at MacArthur's headquarters in Manila during the critical hours immediately following Pearl Harbor. MacArthur's culpable inaction was particularly damaging for America's most powerful means of retaliation, the Far East Air Force in the Philippines. United States Air Force historian, Dr Daniel R. Mortensen, describes the paralysis at MacArthur's headquarters during the initial hours following news of Pearl Harbor:

"Awakened before dawn on December 8, the military and political leaders at Manila realised that the disaster of Pearl Harbor might prevent the reinforcement of the islands. The shock of the Japanese attack on American territory, and the lingering hope that Japan might somehow ignore the Philippines, confused and paralysed MacArthur and other decision-makers. With Quezon urging neutrality, (Admiral) Hart hoping to regroup to the south, and (Major General ) Brereton calling for a strike against Formosa by his ill-prepared bomber squadrons, MacArthur's command post sank in a positive quagmire of indecision". From Delaying Action or Foul Deception, "War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay" (1991) at pages 53-54.

Drawing on the recollections of those who observed MacArthur at his headquarters during the critical nine hours between news of Pearl Harbor reaching Manila and the commencement of the Japanese air assault on the Philippines, his biographer William Manchester describes MacArthur's mental condition at this time as verging on "catatonic". The commander of America's Army and Air Force in the Philippines was observed to be "grey, ill and exhausted." Manchester was not a hostile biographer. He suggests that MacArthur's decision-making faculties may have become paralysed in the hours immediately following Pearl Harbor owing to "overload" caused by conflicting pressures. See William Manchester, "American Caesar", at pp. 230-231.

The inexcusable failure by MacArthur to place American military forces in the Philippines on a proper war footing immediately following news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor compromised the defence of the Philippines. His neglect of his duty to the United States resulted in the effective elimination of American air power in the western Pacific by 15 December 1941, forced the complete withdrawal of the United States Asiatic Fleet from Philippine waters, and paved the way for the Japanese invasion that followed. The Navy and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor were relieved of their commands even though they were taken completely by surprise by the Japanese attack. MacArthur's disgraceful neglect of duty was much worse and would appear to have justified at the very least dismissal from command, and arguably consideration of court martial. MacArthur's subsequent escape to Australia with only his closest staff officers and family enabled him to escape scrutiny of his behaviour at that time. Brereton was posted to duty elsewhere. Senior officers who might have testified to MacArthur's neglect of duty and incompetence as a commander remained in the Philippines, and either died or suffered lengthy imprisonment in Japanese prison camps. Even after the truth became known at the end of World War II, MacArthur had established himself as an heroic figure and was never brought to account for this disgraceful episode in the Battle of the Philippines.

MacArthur was criticised after the war for what appeared to be an inexcusable failure to bring his command to a proper state of readiness to resist the Japanese attack that took place on 8 December 1941. It was suggested that he had failed to obey orders imposed on him by the amended Rainbow -5 war plan and the 5.30 a.m. cable from Washington on 8 December 1941. In his defence, MacArthur relied on the words "..the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" in General Marshall's war warning of 27 November 1941, and said, "my orders were explicit not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese". This ludicrous defence ignored the obvious facts that Pearl Harbor and the bombing of the William B. Preston in Philippine waters were each a hostile "first overt act". In conformity with his standard approach of blaming others for failures in his commands, MacArthur blamed Major General Brereton for the loss of half of the Far East Air Force on the ground.

Major General Brereton cannot escape criticism for the debacle that wiped out American air power in the Philippines in such a short time. Even allowing for MacArthur's fatal inaction during the crucial nine hours that elapsed after news of Pearl Harbor, Brereton should have responded to the danger created by MacArthur's inaction by taking sensible precautions to avoid all of his aircraft being caught on the ground by the Japanese. Those sensible precautions could have included maintaining combat fighter patrols over the main airbases while other fighters were being refueled, dispersing some of his fighters to secondary airfields, and withdrawing all of his B-17s to Mindaneo while MacArthur was paralysed by indecision.

The Japanese cut the American supply line to the Philippines

The Japanese plan to capture the Philippines included necessary military action to isolate the defenders of the Philippines from any hope of reinforcement from the United States. Within hours of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese aircraft bombed Guam and Wake, America's two island outposts between Hawaii and the Philippines. On 10 December 1941, 5,000 troops of Japan's elite South Seas Detachment stormed ashore on Guam and quickly overran the small garrison of 300 US Marines. On 11 December 1941, a Japanese amphibious invasion force approached Wake Island. Here the Japanese received a nasty surprise. The Americans had reinforced their Marine garrison with twelve Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters and 5 inch coastal guns. As the Japanese warships approached Wake, they were subjected to heavy bombardment and were forced to withdraw with the loss of two destroyers and damage to several cruisers, destroyers and transports.

The Japanese mounted daily air attacks on the small Wake Island garrison, and after all of their aircraft had been destroyed, a second much more powerful invasion force attacked the island successfully on 22 December 1941. This second invasion force included two of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's powerful fleet aircraft carriers, Hiryu and Soryu. With three aircraft carriers at his disposal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, could probably have reinforced the defenders of Wake Island from Hawaii, and forced the Japanese into a drawn-out war of attrition in the central Pacific which would have hampered their aggression in the Philippines and the South-West Pacific. Unfortunately, Kimmel was not a bold commander. He passed up the opportunity and allowed Wake Island to fall to the Japanese.

Japanese troops land in the Philippines

Having won complete control of the skies over the Philippines, the Japanese poured in their troops on 22 December 1941. Two divisions of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's 14th Army landed at Lingayen Gulf which is located 120 miles (193 km) north of Manila on the west coast of Luzon. They were opposed by two Philippine Army divisions, but these inexperienced and poorly equipped troops were unable to hold their ground against the battle-toughened Japanese troops, and the Japanese advanced steadily towards Manila. The ease with which the Japanese established themselves on Philippine soil exposed the absurdity of MacArthur's boast that his troops would hold the Japanese on the beaches.

I don’t know, Hat. We did seem to come together as a Nation following 911.

Damned shame that we just about have to have a major catastrophic event for unity to even show itself.

"A day that will live in infamy". Sad Day in American history.

Sadder days to come I'm afraid.

Pink Floyd, Sheep, from the LP Animals

What do you get for pretending the danger's not real?
Meek and obedient, you follow the leader
Down well trodden corridors into the valley of steel

What a surprise!

A look of terminal shock in your eyes
Now things are really what they seem
No, this is no bad dream
Sometimes, things are not what they seem...

You had TWO chances prior to bring up your horseshit on TWO Dec7 threads you started last week.

Piss off moron

I made it as far as the OP before feeling compelled to comment but I’ve never seen that picture in the OP and if one photo can capture the scene as well as the emotional turbulence of that morning that photo in the OP is the ONE. What a clear, colorized and emotional picture that is…..thanks for posting that Rockin!….do you know who took that picture?

I need to get back to the USS Arizona memorial and Pearl Harbor. The last time I was at Pearl was for the 50th anniversary of the attack on December 8, 1991. My wife has to do her annual route qual in January or February and we were trying to figure out where we wanted to go for a few days….maybe Oahu and Pearl. 👍🏼

When you put sanctions on a country and blockade it bad stuff happens. Just as Lincoln forced the civil war Roosevelt pushed Japan into desperation.

Is that when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor?.....

Don't Forget