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Cross filed in my book under Fixing DOD Stupidity�

Real Clear Defense:
January 22, 2014
Save the A-10: Give It to the Army
By Everett Pyatt

Many articles have been written and speeches made about the exploits and success of the A-10 fleet.
It has been a phenomenal airplane in its close air support role.
Support for the A-10 remains so strong that the current National Defense Authorization Act precludes additional retirements.
The confirmation of the Air Force Secretary was delayed while the issue was deliberated in Congress.

Despite widespread recognition of this success, the Air Force wants to junk all 340 aircraft by 2020.
In order to achieve significant savings, the Air Force must cut entire fleets, says Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh.

Retiring the A-10 fleet would achieve a projected $3.7 billion in savings, a decent chunk of the $12 billion the Air Force must cut each year under sequestration.

The Air Force never wanted this aircraft from the start in the 1970s. It was designed to be a tank killer in Western Europe.
Never used in this role, it became a weapon of significance killing armored vehicles in Iraq and providing close air support to ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But it has never really been accepted by the Air Force. Modifications to support modern precision ordnance were slow to be installed and pilots had to use the weapon sensors to find targets, rather than cockpit displays.

The A-10�s orphan heritage is further complicated by the split custody of the aircraft between the Air Force�s active, Guard, and Reserve components.
Half the A-10 fleet resides within the Air National Guard, for example.

The A-10 fleet is over 30 years old, but does not have many flying hours and will be available for many years.
The design is low tech having been designed to operate from unprepared airfields.
This design is still relevant in current military scenarios involving ground forces and assures that many more years of flight hours can be obtained.

Yet current plans call for the Air Force to acquire 1,743 F-35As, about 300 of which would replace the A-10.
Significant testing of the F-35 ground support capabilities has yet to occur.
But the multi-mission design of the aircraft is likely to reduce ground support emphasis.
Pilots have to learn interdiction, air combat and defense suppression before turning to ground support techniques.
It has been done with the F-16, but ground troops prefer support from the A-10 or helicopters.

At current projected prices, 300 F-35s will cost about $37 billion, and operate at much higher cost.

One alternative worthy of consideration would be to transfer the A-10 fleet to the Army with sufficient resources to operate and provide logistic support.
The Army would then update the A-10 combat system to conform to Army standards.
This would allow the Army to integrate the A-10 with existing attack helicopter units and provide a more cohesive close air support capability.
That process might allow the Army to make reductions to attack helicopter forces.

If this sounds familiar, it should. The Marines operate this way now with a combination of fixed and rotary wing aircraft with great success.

However, the 1948 Key West Agreement precludes this change. The policy paper approved by President Harry Truman after the passage of the 1947 National Security Act specifically assigned the Air Force to provide �close combat and logistical support� for the Army.
Since the Agreement did not contemplate the existence of major helicopter forces, the Army was allowed to successfully pursue the military development of helicopter.

Now is the time for a bigger change that will allow the Defense Secretary to make a more thoughtful assignment of ground support responsibilities to ensure they are conducted in the most supportive manner for ground units.

Giving the Army the A-10 would allow the service to fulfill the close air support mission with a quality aircraft.

Retaining the A-10 fleet would cost $3.7 billion, but it would eliminate the need for those 300 F-35As, saving the Pentagon $37 billion.

Such savings would cut about 10% of the Pentagon�s major system cost growth, estimated at $411 billion by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

It would be a first step in managing the issue of cost growth the acquisition system prefers to ignore.

Transfer of the A-10 fleet to the Army is a money saving action avoiding early retirement of proven ground support aircraft. The Key West Agreement should not be allowed to prevent a common sense management action.

Everett Pyatt is the Leader of the Project for Management and Acquisition Leadership at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University. He is formerly Assistant Secretary of the Navy and Acquisition Executive.

IIRC the military was gonna scrap the Warthog in the early 90's�but it turned out the Army was mighty glad to see it deployed in Desert Storm�.

The Air Force will not have any part of those planes going to the Army they rather see them sit in Tuscon at Davis-Montham AFB than see the Army get them! Its one of those things the airforce wanted control of all UAV's the Army told them to go get bent and kept them.

We were glad to see them during OEF and OIF too. We had Marine Corp Super Cobra Helicopters and A10's as CAS on numerous missions. Knowing an A10 is on standby gives you a warm fuzzy when the SHTF.

If the Army did want to grab the A-10, how do I ditch the UH-60 and get in it??? The A-10 is probably the only fixed wing that would interest me.

The problem with that LOGICAL idea, the Key West Accord between the AF & Army precludes it.

Google it.

I love the A-10. What a bada$$ aircraft!

Eric

Of all the aircraft I worked on while serving in the AF, the A-10 was my favorite. If the AF doesn't want them then let the Army have them.

Now that there is no need for SAC the Air Force should become the Army Air Corp again. 99% of the Air Force mission today is in support of the Army in one capacity or another.

Put a itty-bitty little rotor on it and call it a attack helicopter!

If the Air Force needs to cut spending the first thing they need to do is ground AF-1. Let the AIC fly commercial...

Better yet deport him back to Kenya.

That is called the AH-64 Apache. Similar armaments. The Army WANTED the A-10 when it was introduced but AF jet-jockeys had a fit about Army officers flying fixed wing aircraft.

Not just the Army. I was quite pleased by what I saw while serving with 2nd Tank Bn, 2nd Marine Division in the Gulf War as well.

The Air Force never wanted this airframe in the first place. During the cold war and up until the money dried up, they were obsessed with only one thing: Single Seat fighters to mix it up with the Soviets over Eastern Europe. CAS to them was a redheaded step child best left to the other Services, Army and Navy. During Desert Storm the aircraft was the MVP of the conflict, not only in the CAS role, but when Saddam and the worthless (but popular among reporters and idiots) SCUD attacks came to the forefront, it became the darling. Great airplane and BTW, it saved my airframe, the S-3 as they have common engines and our were worn out so we were able to buy 100 power plants.

There's not only that Key West Accord (which is only paperwork after all) but one tiny little problem: The Army doesn't have runways. So they'd have to operate their A-10s from Air Force bases. And maintain them there. So if the only difference would be the color of the pilot's flight suit, what real savings would you have?

Rock, it don't take much of a runway for an A-10.

Are quite a few Army bases and joint bases that have runways they could operate from.

"Not much of a runway" is a whole lot more than a helipad - which is all the Army has.

If I'm wrong about that, forgive me. I've been out of active duty for a long time.