Just to elaborate a bit more. Planned occupation and control of the strait by the allies was a good idea, and would offer advantages, but just a pipe dream - just like saying it would have been strategically significant to control Hitler, it doesn't make sense because there is actually no valid strategy behind being able to do that.
The Brits never properly considered what occupation would mean and hence a strategy was never developed. If they had at least considered some of the planning aspects if would've become evident that this is not valid for consideration of developing a strategy. Everything going against this idea include: they would need to be able to maintain and defend occupation along the entire 30mile stretch of the strait including Constantinople; occupation in enemy territory leading to constant, heavy retaliation; no land support available from the allies - all supplies to come if from the ocean and having to constantly protect and defend the ports available.
The allies were already struggling on the Western front and it was hoped that this campaign would take the pressure off but it would've only created an additional drain on resources and troops. Negative overall net gain, no strategic value.
The decision to proceed was not strategic but a gamble and based on an unobtainable outcome. Churchill was a narcissist and keen to get a good victory under his belt, but also a gambler of the worst kind - 140,000 ally casualties at Gallipoli with half being British and Irish.
Some interesting comments here:
https://history.stackexchange.com/q...of-the-dardanelles-fiasco-in-world-war-i
