Ok Ok one last thought. As i see it...by 1942 the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of operations along the entire russian front and chose to pursue a drive to the oil fields...case blue. This was done in desperation imho.
Hitler split AGS into A and B for the summer offensive 42'
Army Group B (von Weichs) had the task of
protecting north flank of Army Group A (von List)
headed for Caucasus...AG-B could not hold the line
at the Volga thus the threat of AG-A being cut off
and isolated in the south ..forced AG-A to withdraw.
AG-A even without the threat of being cut-off was
exhausted and stretching German logistics to the
utmost extreme - crazily beyond what they planned
they were capable of sustaining for an offensive in
the East ..and it was showing.
Eduard Wagner (
Quartermaster-General) calculated
Germany had the resources to go 500-800 km into the
Ukraine prior to Barbarossa,.. the 42' push for oilfields
in the South was some 1600 km... November 1941 he
reported -
"We are at the end of our resources in both
personnel and material. We are about to be confronted
with the dangers of deep winter." ....then in 1942 prior
to his visit to inspect 6th Army at Battle of Stalingrad,
he informed Hitler of the -
"lack of sources of fuel."He was also implicated in the failed bomb plot and shot
himself in July 1944...does that mean he was one
of the better Nazis?.. Not at all for he is responsible
for the regs that had the Army co-operating with
Einsatzgruppen...and since he also had the task
of looking after security in the rear areas, he bears
responsibility for the killing conducted by other
security services.
Had Hitler captured Baku oilfields intact , how was
he planning to get the bulk oil back to Germany
and annexed regions to benefit from such?
