'Nother good'un from RealClearHistory.com...

http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-15/news/mn-3404_1_west-point-s-cemetery

Most of the soldiers killed at Little Bighorn were not properly identified and were buried hastily in shallow graves. Over the years, animals and the elements scattered many of the bones, while tourists carted off others.

Custer got the most decent burial. He was laid in a fairly deep grave--18 inches. The body of Custer's brother, Tom, was laid alongside. The bodies were covered with blankets and a canvas tarp. After it was filled in, the grave was covered with an Indian stretcher, which was weighted down with rocks.

Those efforts should have protected the bodies, leaving two full skeletons for a cavalry detachment that returned a year later to dig up Custer, Snow said.


The exhumation team did not find the stretcher, the rocks, the blankets or the canvas. The grave they believed was Custer's contained only one skeleton. After exhuming it, the diggers discovered that the rotting uniform containing the skeleton bore a corporal's name. They dug up a nearby grave which contained only a skull, rib cage and leg bone. The exhumation team decided those bones were Custer's and shipped them to West Point for burial.

"It sounds like they just moved over to the next grave and said, 'This is Custer,' " Snow said.

McChristian agrees that the exhumation team concluded they "got the right bones the second time but failed to say how they identified the remains any more thoroughly than the first ones."

Evan Connell, author of the Custer biography "Son of the Morning Star," agrees that the exhumation was an unprofessional job, but he thinks the second body dug up was Custer's.

"My impression is they probably got it right the second time," Connell said. A lock of auburn hair found with those remains was sent to Elizabeth Custer, who said it matched her husband's, Connell said.

If the job of digging up Custer was bungled, the exhumation team shouldn't be blamed, said Richard Hardorff of DeKalb, Ill., who published a book on the burials and exhumations at the Little Bighorn.

"Put yourself in their place," Hardorff said. "You see the bones, you see skeletons, but you're used to seeing a living person with a certain face, a certain manner of moving around, but all that's gone. They did the best they could" to identify Custer's bones.

Bruce Liddic of Syracuse, N.Y., who published a book about Custer's burial, said there's a slim chance "that out of pure dumb luck they got the right body, but I doubt it."

He's still dead. What did they expect?
How about John Paul Jones? He is supposed to be in a lead coffin at the Naval Academy, but they haven't opened the box. Look up coffin liquor.

Would need a name tag.

Folks I have known for along time are not recognized when dead.

Personally, I would rather be left out on that battlefield. I've been to both places, Last Stand Hill and the cemetery on West Point.

Very interesting Birdwatcher, you bring lots of history to this site. TY

Nah, Porter opened Jones's coffin when they found it in Paris, and it's definitely him. You can find the pix online pretty easily - old salt's long braided hair and all. It's a cool story.

As I recall, the exhumation team determined the only mutilation to the second body was as described by the Indians, i.e. primarily his ears were pierced with an Awl, to open them so he could hear in the after life, because he sure didn't listen very well in life.

George really doesn't care where his bones are.

George wishes he would have taken the Gatling guns with him.

And maybe Winchester repeaters! memtb

It takes a pretty good crew to feed and fire the Gatling Guns. I doubt they'd have been much help.
Custer had taken them on an earlier scout, and found that they slowed down the column considerably.
The original plan was for the 7th to drive the Indians to the approaching infantry.
Custer didn't want to share the glory, and bit off way more than he could chew.
7mm

Lol...it would SUCK to be remembered forever as that guy.

Heroes and Villains live on in memory for a long time. Sometimes a combination of the two is remembered the longest.

All it takes is one "screw up" to go from hero to zero.

Right? But that guy always seemed like a "don't try this at home" story.

The recipe for success, or failure is only one ingredient different.

Or waited for some reinforcements.....

Most of the troopers were killed in less than half an hour after the horse mounted charge into the valley, some of them committed suicide according to eye witness accounts of Indians that were there that day.

George was authorized several days prior to this ‘tour’ by the War Departmentto draw new repeating rifles but being a traditionlist he stuck with the single shooters!

Maybe that speaks to being last in his class at WP!!

"He'd prefer to be left to lie, his bones covered in the winter by snow and in the summer by sweet grasses and wild flowers; the gentle breezes of spring could pass over his bones and the rains occasionally wash them clean." Daniel C. "The Long Shooters."

One of my great, great grandfathers was also a Union Solider. The location of his remains are not know to us.

Custer had taken them on an earlier scout, and found that they slowed down the column considerably.
slowing the column might have been a good thing
The original plan was for the 7th to drive the Indians to the approaching infantry.
how'd that work out?

Custer didn't want to share the glory, and bit off way more than he could chew.
political dreams have a way of getting in the way of abilities at times.

"Over the years, animals and the elements scattered many of the bones, while tourists carted off others."

Tourists carried off the bones of the US soldiers. Thank you birdwatcher. And just imagine how many empty cartridge cases the tourists carried off.

You'd be surprised at the resistance at that time, and later, shown to advances we take for granted now. And at a very high level in the Ordnance Dept..

The Army resisted repeaters because they would waste ammo. During the development of the M1 Garand, John C. was told specifically to design it without a DBM "Because the soldiers would lose them.". Doug MacArthur shoved the .30-06 down the designer's throat due to inventory levels. As originally designed, it was a 10-shot .276.

We were LAST to develop a modern rifle with spitzer bullets, hells bells, they were still using the Trapdoor fighting the Cubans and Spanish. They had Mausers, in 7mm, with Spitzer bullets.

Look at WWII tanks, specifically German vs American. MG42 vs 1919. Not so much rate of fire, but look how fast they could change barrels without having to set headspace, etc...which help keeps the gun operational.

I honestly think Custer could have thought things out better, tactically, but equipment-wise, higher-ups had a lot to do with his choices, and he may have had his own ideas, as you pointed out, in deference to "tradition". It is sad it turned out like it did.

But having missed that show, I'll not be too concrete in my opinion. Custer did a helluva job in the State-to-State unpleasantness, regardless of which side you sympathize with.

lmao did no one read the uber thread on Custer (the TV documentary)? A lot of good info and a lot of ignorance was shown already. Fuggs sake, every dipshidt with a keyboard is an expert.

There is little chance that Custer is buried in his own grave. The family won't allow DNA testing and for good cause. What does it really matter, Custer died with the rest of his command and is probably at rest with them at the battlefield.

Many myths have passed on about Custer and the battle and many have been repeated here:

Gatling guns; Had Custer taken the Gatling gun with him, he would have survived the battle because Gatlings are pulled by condemned cavalry mounts and the terrain they had to cover would have held him up a couple days with the guns, saving him from what happened on June 25.

As to his ineptness:

General Nelson A.Miles who is regarded as one of the best Indian wars generals said this of Custer:

"The more I see of movement here (Little Big Horn Battlefield), the more I have admiration for Custer, and I am satisfied his like will not be found very soon again.”

~ Gen. Nelson Miles, Commanding General of the Army

Custer turned down repeating rifles:

Custer took what guns he was issued with him to the Little Bighorn. He had no say in what guns he took other than his own which was a Remington Rolling Block and 2 revolvers not of Army issue. The myth that repeating rifles would have helped the cavalry is just not true. There are too many reasons that the Army chose the Trapdoor for military use to go into all the reasons they were armed with the Trapdoor. If the Indians had been so much better armed than the Cavalry, the rest of the day and next day even with the captured guns from Custer, they would have prevailed against Reno and Benteen, but they didn't.

Some claim that Custer had political aspirations to be president, but there is absolutely no truth in that, he had been active to some degree in politics, but not for himself.

You could write a dozen books to dispel the myths and untruths about Custer and the Little Big Horn, but it is best to find real resources backed by facts and you will come away with a different view of George Custer...

That did occur to me. I guess it would help to know too how much ammo they would have had among them.

I've read a book or two on the Little Big Horn over the decades, and some Indian accounts. Reluctant as Indians generally were to accept casualties it seems reasonable to assume Custer's group up on that last hill were not overrun until almost all of 'em were dead (gunfire and descending arrows?) and/or the survivors ran out of ammo.

Yep. Thinking I, and at least half the folks commenting on what he shoulda coulda done, would line up like scared rabbits behind his leadership in a heartbeat when faced against the redman he had fought on numerous occassion recognizing leadership under fire. Things don't 't always work out as planned, that is why games are played till time runs out.

They don't typically hand out brevet generalships to dipshits.

If he'd taken the Gatlings, he would of lived, because they would of slowed him down enough that he never would of caught the Indians.

Sorta similar, in San Fernando Cathedral here in San Antonio there is a sarcophagus on display reportedly containing the bones of Bowie, Crockett, and Travis.

In the actual event, after the battle the bodies of the 200+ defenders were stacked in three piles amid piled brush and branches and incinerated. The bodies were reportedly incompletely burned and the ghastly piles were left for a period of months, fed upon by everything from a horde of vultures to stray dogs. It was Juan Seguin, a local Tejano who had know all three men, who finally took it upon himself to bury the remains, mostly in pits near the cremation sites. At this time he is said to have separated the remains of the three leaders and interred them inside the church. Decades later these remains were later discovered and exhumed, and placed in the present sarcophagus.

No word on how Juan Seguin identified the remains after they had lain months in the open.

At least one of the mass burial pits was later uncovered and the collected remains reburied next to the grave of Samuel Walker up in the Oddfellow's Cemetery overlooking downtown.

Who was is that said of handguns "Ya can't miss fast enough to hit."

...but I expect you can run out of ammo pretty quick.

I was not, there but have read the many if not all bodies were butchered in celebration.
If so, how does one tell whose is whose?

The burial detail couldn't tell much about individual troopers other than identifying marks or tattoos. They were mostly mutilated beyond recognition...

If I ever make it back down there love to link up with you, to tour the battlefield again. I would even buy you coffee at the towne pump gas station. I toured it on June 25 2016. Pretty cool day to visit. Anyhow I heard/read that the Indians were scared to death of sabres, do you think it was mistake to leave the sabres behind? Another one I heard was the Indians were scared of the infantry, but i think I read somewhere on here you said the Indians whipped the infantry in a earlier battle.

By all means contact me, I have access to places you can't go. Custer chose to travel light and fast. Sabres were unnecessary bulk, and made noise when traveling on horseback. The force of General Crook met Crazy Horse at the Rosebud and were soundly thrashed and with few casualties retreated back to Fort Fetterman. No one seems to review Crook's actions that definitely had an effect on the outcome of the battle, as he had almost 1,000 men and they were nowhere near the Little Bighorn during Crook's retreat.

Standing on the battlefield was definitely a real eye opener. Big country for sure, I can only imagine what those troopers were going through full retreat out of the Little Bighorn.. different time for sure, those men sure in hell a lot better than me.

The Indians were scared to death of sabers?

Ain’t we talking people who trained for combat from early childhood? Ain’t these the guys for whom one cultural ideal was to kill a grizzly in hand to hand combat? These are guys who customarily wore their combat records in their hair. People who would take risks to ludicrous extremes like carrying sticks into a fight rather than weapons, and doing stuff like staking themselves on a leash to the ground in the face of charging enemies.

Down here in Texas, Texas Ranger Captain RIP Ford had more experience fighting Plains Indians than any other White man who lived to tell about it. Ford’s take was that on horseback the bow and arrow were fully the equal of the revolver. An Indian on horseback could shoot you with an arrow just as easily while running away as he did on the attack, deadly 60 yards or less, could hit your horse unerringly at 100. Ford described the Indian method of archery as firing from a bow held flat and low, today what we would call aiming by instinct. Arrows were held between the fingers, ready to be rapidly placed in the bow, accounts of Indian archery demonstrations speaking of as many as five arrows being accurately fired in rapid succession before the first one had hit the ground.

If I were an Indian in a running fight with the cavalry I would have been overjoyed if they had chosen to bring knives to a gunfight.

IIRC we have that one famous saber charge against the Cheyennes, OF COURSE they scattered before it, doesn’t mean they were out of the fight if they had chosen to fight. Can anyone relate a single incidence outside of a camp massacre situation where any Indian was ever whacked by a cavalry saber?

OTOH I am aware of an account at least one incidence where a Lakota Indian used a cavalry saber on other Indians in a fight.

Fine words.

I'm thinking you are missing the point.. when Custer and his boys were hauling ass on there horses to lay down an ass whooping they would of had there sabers drawn. A guy on a horse swinging a saber might have you rethink some things. But as shrapnel said Custer wanted to move fast and carrying sabers was not beneficial to them. Far as the last stand area we know from history what happened to there rifles..

Interesting audio interview:

http://cpa.ds.npr.org/sdpb/audio/2016/03/dm_Images_Enright_03142016.mp3

The story:

Custer Family Tragedy

With respect to a reluctance to engage in hand to hand combat, I suspect this was one of Remington's all-time favorite paintings




We tend to talk in terms of "Indians ALWAYS did this or Indians ALWAYS did that", forgetting that everyone involved were individuals and that for Indians fighting soldiers and cavalry sent by a steadily encroaching industrial superpower was a much different affair than endless skirmishes and revenge warfare against neighboring tribes for reputation, captives and glory.

Here is a pretty good synopsis of that famous 1857 US Cavalry saber charge against the Cheyenne... http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1555&context=greatplainsquarterly

Note there may be two definitions of "victory" and "defeat" involved. The Cheyennes in this instance were such newbies when it came to fighting concentrations of US troops that they reportedly believed magic would protect them from bullets. When Colonel Sumner instead elected for a charge with sabers they did break and run so Sumner "won". However the casualties suffered by the Indians were light, possibly lighter than the cavalry, for the most part the Indians easily outrunning the heavily-burdened cavalry horses In that respect it was hardly a loss the as the Indians would likely define it. Certainly, in the sort of hunter-gathering economy within which the Cheyennes operated, every man lost would have had a significant effect on the welfare of the tribe as a whole, but few were.

'Course, 18 years later, some of the kids of those same Cheyenne were likely present at the Battle of the Rosebud against Crook. I suspect if Crook had tried a saber charge against THAT bunch his men would have been shot to pieces, bullets and arrows both. The gist of RIP Ford's memoirs concerning fighting Comanches in Texas indicates the same thing. The most potent weapon on the Plains was probably the rifle, including the muzzleloading rifle, flint or percussion. What you did is get within rifle range, get off of your horse and shoot the other guy off of his. Ford fought and won most of his many Indians fights that way.

In any case at the Little Big Horn, retreat was not an option for the Indians, even if they had been innately scared of saber charges. Custer was attacking a camp full of their women and children.

Has anyone checked Shrapnel's colon?

I dunno why anyone would, how did he get to be the issue? I'm just BSing about history is all.....


but IIRC at the Little Big Horn many if not most of the Indians at different points in the fight were crawling on their bellies, raining bullets and arrows upon the besieged dismounted cavalrymen from cover.

I'm pretty sure Pop History has it that Plains Indians never fought that way.

That is a Russell painting, unless you were referring to Remington's appreciation of Russell's work...

um.... yes, of course I was.....


...but who could forget "When Sioux and Blackfoot Meet."

Looser probably didn't remember much.

I am in the second of the books i ordered after the original exchange on Custer. The book is "the custer myth" by W.A. Graham.
one thing that jumps out a me is the participation of the crow and the arikara indians as allies of the white folds. i realize there was reasons for animosity between these tribes and the sioux, but interesting two other tribes would ally with the calvary against the sioux.
interesting also from the indian accounts, not all the indians swarmed out to meet custer.
custer split his command multiple times against a numerically superior enemy, used long range weapons in an environment where those magazine fed guns had an atvantage, did not have backup, and was relying on past experience that the indians would run when they didnt.
fascinating reading this stuff.
One thing i have already learned, it didn't happen the way popular culture says it happened.
from reading the remarks of some of the indians, his men didn't break and run, and fought in a uniform manner, and were thought to be brave men.

Ya well, he might if you sent him off into the next world missing his hair and assorted body parts.

Do you like that book?

i am about half way through it, mostly statements from various indians of what they saw and heard. Hard to know the accuracy given translation differences, what they wanted their audience to hear, etc. It was interesting to see the respect they gave custer and his troopers, that they fought well. It brings up points i am going to try to understand the more that i think of it.
one point was that if reno would have pressed his attack, with custer being in the position he should have been where the attacks would have been coordinated at the same time, things might have gone differently.
i guess it is the fog of war. I think one of those pouches carried 20 rounds of ammo, a belt probably about 30. I keep going back to thinking i would not have wanted my reserve ammo in a saddlebag distanced from me.
It's easy to hindsight something. there is little things but important things brought out, such as the condition of the calvary horses, basically spent, and so on. I keep thinking custer ran into the perfect storm. I also did not know sitting bull was not an active participant, and there was a hint the other chiefs didn't like him. the more i read the more i realize how little i really know.

I have two 1870 rolling blocks, both marked U.S. that came off the san carlos apache reservation. I don't know their history ,and if they were given to the apache, or captured by the apache.
For that matter i didn't know if the military ever used rolling blocks, but they are marked U.S.
makes one wonder.
there are references in the book of indians using the weapons of fallen troopers. Which led me to thinking about those rolling blocks. I believe custer carried a rolling block.

one of my wife's daughters moved up to about 20miles or so distance of the rez on the dakota boarder with nebraska. i keep thinking i am going to eventually have to use that as a base to explore where the battle took place, and the battle on the rosebud.
i have been over crooks base near prescott in arizona, and didn't realize until starting to read this stuff he was up there too.

i keep thinking he was hoping for a repeat of the washita river, and the indians didn't play that game.

Uuuuhh...

Interesting links. Thanks for posting.
7mm

The Washita? That brings up the issue of Major Elliot, which raises the question of what would have been the consequences for Custer leaving men behind today?

http://www.historynet.com/wounds-from-the-washita-the-major-elliott-affair.htm

IIRC Captain Benteen despised Custer even before this incident.

Benteen's opinion of the man certainly bears looking into when studying the life of George Armstrong Custer.


....and the fact that Custer would even leave without ascertaining where Elliot was speaks volumes about his own perceived opinion of the Indians as adversaries.

When the 7th Cavalry rode to the Little Bighorn—and death and glory—in June 1876, it was a military column fractured by internal dissent. Other such units on the frontier had their share of personality conflicts and cliques, but few to such a degree. The mistrust, resentment and fear of betrayal many 7th Cavalry officers harbored toward Custer were in no small part a result of the Elliott affair. Whether it adversely affected the regiment’s martial performance after the Washita is a point for de-bate. But certainly the regiment would have performed its frontier duties with more confidence and less second-guessing had it not been for all the suspicion and mistrust. Custer’s tragedy at the Little Bighorn dwarfed Elliott’s tragedy at the Washita, but it is impossible to forget or dismiss the obvious links between the two.

Benteen historically hated Custer, some has to be attributed to Custer’s advancing to General at such a young age and having rank over Benteen who was older.

As far as Major Elliott and being left on the field of battle, has everything to do with Elliott taking an unauthorized leave of Custer’s command and riding on to his own death. At the point Custer left Black Kettle’s village, it was late in the day, Indians were coming from another camp on the Washita. Custer feigned another attack at the oncoming Indians to set them back and then pulled a full retreat with the rest of his command.

From the beginning, Custer had orders to attack, destroy all essential elements of the encampment and to kill all the ponies. His troopers rejected the idea of killing the ponies, but were forced to complete the act.

This was a winter campaign and days were short and cold. Saving his remaining troops was of greater importance than looking for Major Elliott at their expense.

Most of what you hear of this is from Benteen who had written a letter to a newspaper, condemning Custer’s actions. After the battle, Phil Sheridan went back to the site and found the remains of Elliott and his command, also finding nothing wrong with Custer’s actions.

Don't know if it's still in print, but years ago I read a book called "The court martial of George Armstrong Custer."
If he had survived he might not have been treated kindly.

Lots of books have been written, the truth is, because he didn’t survive he was treated badly...

Elliot left ( abandoned?) his own command of a column to pursue the fleeing Indians.

According to Sergeant Ryan..when Custer received word that Elliott was missing, he sent Captain Myers and a party
for Elliott. Myers' efforts were in vain and reported such to Custer.

With a substantial number (couple thousand ?) warriors mustering from camps some miles further down stream
(reported by.1st Lt. Edward S. Godfrey) and moving in a direction toward Custer...Custer moved his men in that direction
and bluffed the warriors into dispersing back to their villages to protect their families...which gave Custer the time
to haul ass out of there to prevent a possible disaster.

Some say Elliot uttered the words ' a brevet or a coffin' to an officer in his column before going on his fateful persuit.

Custers reported tendency to detail his own battlefield achievements but to be rather vague or in some cases even ignore
citing important actions and efforts by other officers in the 7th didn't help his relationships or reputation.

This is true, yet people still condemn Custer for his actions that day. Plenty of his subordinate officers from that campaign followed Custer to the Little Bighorn with the exception of Benteen, they had great admiration and respect for Custer.

Godfrey was a Lieutenant at the time and later became a General and much of his testimony after the LBH battle was very candid and without criticism of Custer.

It seems that more is written about Custer by people that don’t know much about him than those who do...

The custer myth
w.a. graham
page 294

"the tactics of the indians on that day resulted in their doing to custer exactly what custer had planned tactically to do to them. And they were able to do it because they had the leaders, the arms, and the overwhelming forces, none of which facts were known or appreciated by the 7th Calvary. Their numbers had been underestimated, their leadership and fighting capacity undervalued, their superiority in arms not even suspected. The 7th cavalry paid the penalty for national stupidity."

Interesting words. Good book, it didn't have to happen on multiple levels, but it did.

Custer got a bum rap.

Would that qualify as counting coup for the individual who did it?

Looking back with the luxury of hindsight.....

Custer had more than 500 men during his Washita expedition.....

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Washita_River

...well armed, disciplined, trained.

Versus maybe 6,000 Cheyenne’s, Arapahos and Lakotas spread out along maybe ten miles of river. 6,000 Indians translates to around 1,200 ( one in five) males of combat age, indifferently armed, not operating as a cohesive trained unit.

Custer “slips away” after a feint. What?, Were they airlifted out from a rendezvous point?

Custer brung out more than fifty Cheyenne women and children, on foot.

So what, Custers column about-faced OUT-RAN 1,200 highly skilled Indians who could cover 100 miles a day at a horse-killing pace?

It was Ranald MacKenzie’s taking of Comanche women and children that finally led to the end of the Red River War, the hostile being naturally concerned about their families. I’m gonna suggest here that it was those 50+ Cheyenne women and children held captive that got Custer’s command away safely.

They were effectively used as human shields by Custer by dispersing them through his column which largely deterred the warriors,
but didn't totally blunt attacks on the retreating 7th. Counter charges led by officers Weir, Benteen and Myers fended off attacks
giving them further breathing space.

Custer defended that action;

“..the close proximity of their women and children, and their necessary exposure in case of conflict, would operate as a powerful argument
in favor of peace.”

-- George Armstrong Custer, My Life on the Plains: Or, Experiences with Indians (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1874), 220.

Benteen, a prominent Custer critic, weren’t no slouch. Look at his early record aggressively pursuing superior numbers of Cheyenne. Also, allowing an Indian youth to fire on him repeatedly with a revolver at the Washita in an attempt to avoid killing the youth prob’ly speaks volumes as to his character.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Benteen

Another insight into his character, a year after the Little Big Horn at the inquiry.... from Evan S Connel.....

Benteen explained to the 1879 Court of Inquiry why he did what he did, and his reasoning is equally clear from subsequent remarks. He thought it impossible to obey; to do so would have been suicide. ”We were at their hearths and homes” he said referring to the Sioux ”their medicine was working well and they were fighting for all the good God gives anyone to fight for.

Sounds like a field commander with an incisive understanding of his enemy to me, his credibility further enhanced by his subsequent leadership while under heavy fire on Reno Hill.

My guess is that Benteen’s take on Custer as being a braggart who consistently failed to credit the officers in his command so as to enhance his own reputation was an accurate one. Not necessarily a terminal slam on Custer from the likes of me. Fighting Generals don’t gotta be Miss Congeniality and Custer’s record in the War of Secession was exemplary. He just weren’t all that great in the Indian Wars is all, certainly not at the Washita.

JMHO

Benteen was a courageous and valiant leader among men. He was more than capable, not only in the Indian wars, but throughout the Civil War as well. You can only imagine how much more effective he could have been had he not hated Custer so much. Speculating on a man's thoughts in war or peace doesn't settle or change what happened, so I won't suggest that Beneteen acted according to his hatred of Custer. Make no mistake about it, Benteen hated Custer.

The continued misunderstanding of the Indian Wars and why they happened has changed with time as people apply 21st century humanitarian views on what happened or what should have happened. Custer was not an Indian hater, he was perhaps, the Indian's greatest ally on the American Frontier. Every encounter Custer had was under orders and not on his own volition to kill or exterminate Indians.

General Phil Sheridan, commander of the Department of the Missouri, issued orders for the Washita River expedition, including the following: "…to destroy [Indian] villages and ponies, to kill or hang all warriors, and to bring back all woman and children [survivors] . " The purpose of this "total war" strategy was to make "all segments of Indian society experience the horrors of war as fully as the warriors".

This is a quote from Custer and his book "My Life On The Plains" in regards to Indians...

Yepper, the Regular Army was often the Indian's best friend. Happened over and over again.

Again, hindsight being 20/20, IMHO Custer screwed up at the Washita, tho one does wonder what Major Elliot thought he was gonna accomplish with just seventeen men.

Best guesses now Custer was only outnumbered 2 or 3:1 by actual combatives at the Washita, and the fact that he had taken Cheyenne women and children prisoners likely did more than anything else to bring the shooting to a close.

Purely for purposes of further discussions of the period, I googled up the Battle of Saline River, August 1867, wherein eighty-plus well-armed and competently led Buffalo Soldiers stood off five times their number of Cheyenne combatives and retired in good order. Of course nobody's camp was under attack so the Indians were likely less motivated in that instance....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Saline_River

Their Commanding Officer on the occasion, one George Augustus Armes is prob'ly worth a google search all by hisself; court-martialed three times, once for assaulting the actual Governor of Pennsylvania, reinstated twice, second wife twenty years younge than him, last shot in 1910, age 66. Chest wound, walked himself to the hospital to have the bullet removed.

https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1902/08/22/118476299.pdf

And one more before I lose the link.

Once in awhile you come across mention of of some remarkable guy operating all through a period of turmoil. Down here in Comancheria JJ "Doc" Sturm was one such guy, a Hill Country German who attached himself to the Comanches in the 1850's as their agricultural adviser on the short-lived Brazos Reservation, ended up living with them the rest of his life. Married a Creek woman later in life who helped him in his medical practice, his reputation for generosity to all still esteemed in Indian Country to this day. After Palo Duro Canyon it was Doc Sturm, at the behest of Ranald McKenzie, who rode out to the hostile Comanche camps alone to bring them in peacefully.

Here's another one I just found, "The Second William Penn", William H. Ryus, born 1839, six years on the Santa Fe Trail, who published a book of reminiscences in 1913.

https://www.medicinemangallery.com/the-second-william-penn.html

Many times, while I was crossing the plains, have bands of from 30 to 40 Indian or more come to us, catching up with us or passing us by. Had I not understood them and their intentions as well as I did we would more than likely have had trouble with them or have suffered severe inconvenience.

We never thought of fear when they were going along the road, and many times I would call them when I would camp for meals to come and get a cup of coffee. They would go back with us to camp. We did not care what their number was, we would always divide our provisions with them. If there were a large number of Indians, and our provisions were scarce, I would tell them so, but also tell them that notwithstanding that fact I still had some for them. Then if they only got a few sups of coffee around and a little piece of bread they were always profoundly grateful and satisfied that we had done our best.

In order to let them know we were scarce of bread, etc., I would say, “poka te keta pan;” in the Mexican language that is interpreted “very little bread.” Bread, in the Mexican or Indian language, is “pan,” and when they understood they would say “si,” which is interpreted “yes.” They showed us their appreciation for the little they received just as though we had given them a whole loaf of bread apiece.

If we only had a few cups of coffee and had 70 or 80 Indian guests we would give it to one of the Indians and he would divide it equally among his number. He would place the cup so it would contain an equal amount of the coffee. Then one of the Indians would get up from the ground (they always sit on the ground grouped all about us when they ate with us) and take the cups and hand them around to every fifth man, or such a one as would make it average to every cup of coffee they had. The Indians would break the bread and give to each one, according to what his share equally divided would be. When they come to drink their coffee every Indian who had a cup would raise it to their lips at once, take a swallow of the beverage, then pass the cup on to the next one. They did the bread the same way. After finishing their repast they invariably thanked us profusely in their Indian style for what they had been given. There were times when I had plenty of provisions to give them all they needed or required to satisfy their hunger. At no time was my coach surrounded with hostile intent without departing from it in friendliness. At the same time, I knew they had some great grievances.

Could be twaddle, maybe not, prob'ly worth a look.

You may want to do a little more research on Custer’s Indian affiliation. Black Hills expedition of 1874, confrontation of Southern Cheyenne chief Stone Forehead, and why Grant almost forbade him to lead the 7th Cavalry in Montana in1876. Custer was a person not the Regular Army...

I can google it same as anyone, was Stone Forehead the guy who tapped out his pipe on Custer's boot? I am a tad disappointed ya just didn't post the info yourself. But the fact remains, the Army was often the Indians' best friend, before and after the 1860's. I never suggested Custer hated Indians.

Do you think he fathered a child by that Cheyenne woman after the Washita as some stories, including Cheyenne stories, suggest?

I was friends with a full blood cheyenne who lived on the reservation not far from the battlefield...I worked with him in billings..his name was little coyotee, according to him they were thought through the generations that Custer was a great man and actually did a lot for the cheyenne...this kinda surprised me he had absoutly nothin bad to say....not even proud of the battle victory....however I found it funny he hated Crows with a passion and would fight them at every chance in the bars in billings...sadly he was killed by those same crows...

That’s too bad, but the hate among the Crow, Sioux and Cheyenne was for generations. The Crow’s Nest in the Wolf Mountains was named for where the Crows would hide the horses they stole from the Cheyenne. They hated the Sioux for running them out of their hunting ground in the Black Hills. Crows scouted for Custer due to their hatred of the Sioux and Cheyenne, not considering that fact that they were sealing their own fate as well as the Sioux and Cheyenne and all of the plains Indians.

Tribal hatred is as old as mankind, it still exists with the Suni, Shiite and the other tribal rivalries in the Mideast today, no different than the 19th century Indians...

I wouldn’t hazard to guess on the chances of his frontier love affairs, I know he was devoted enough to Libby to get Court Martialed for leaving his post to see her. I have seen a signed first edition “My Life On The Plains” that he had given to his black cook while on his western campaigns. Some will claim he had relations with her, she was also Elizabeth, but how do you prove that one way or other?

I do know that it was only $25,000.00 that kept me from buying that book...

That’s too bad, but the hate among the Crow, Sioux and Cheyenne was for generations. The Crow’s Nest in the Wolf Mountains was named for where the Crows would hide the horses they stole from the Cheyenne. They hated the Sioux for running them out of their hunting ground in the Black Hills. Crows scouted for Custer due to their hatred of the Sioux and Cheyenne, not considering that fact that they were sealing their own fate as well as the Sioux and Cheyenne and all of the plains Indians.

Tribal hatred is as old as mankind, it still exists with the Suni, Shiite and the other tribal rivalries in the Mideast today, no different than the 19th century Indians...[/quote

According to my friend stealing was an excepted practice among tribes.. Still is..They had a different outlook than white man...if you have property it's yours only if you can protect it...if it gets stolen it your own fault...I was down on the reservation with him shooting prairie dogs one weekend and they stole all my gas..he warned me to sleep with my rifle and ammo...which I did....luckily I had a 5 gal can to get me to town they didn't touch it...I was pissed but he shrugged it off....

Just so I can read this tomorrow.

One of the most interesting threads ever posted on The Campfire (for me).

Always good stuff to see the topic-educated spar.

maybe shrap can answer this for me.
there seems to be very little comment on crook, who had a pretty good size group with him, that ran into the indians at the rosebud, on his way to meet up with custer, terry, gibbons, and had a battle which at best was a draw. But, and a big but, he turned around after that instead of continuing to the bighorn.
If he would have continued perhaps things would have been different.

Crook is interesting to me in the calvary had a base near yarnell/congress in arizona. they at one time had a bunch of indians holed up there.
My mother lived at a trading post in the 20's near there that belonged to the family. they did have indian customers.
lots of stories about those days.
evidently crook was considered special by the indians.

I was at the Custer Battlefield a couple weeks ago. Powerful place. I was thinking of bringing some old spent cartridge cases and tossing them about. I wonder if that would of been illegal. This is a great thread, I hope it can continue. I went to Pompeys pillar the same day. I always thought in my own head that the pillar and Clarks name sorta signifies the 'beginning of the end' of the western Indian horse culture and the battlefield, not too far away signifies the 'End'. I was surprised at some of the tourists at the battlefield, wouldn't do any walking on the paths 'cuz they were afraid of snakes or it was to rugged down towards the river.

I remember being there and hearing the dry "shukka, shukka" all along the paths. I also felt some sort of "historical presence" that I cannot adequately explain, but it was very real.

Not from a historical point of view, but more as an observer, I don’t know why Crook wasn’t held more accountable for what he didn’t do. Crook had almost 1,000 men with him and a mass of Indian scouts that probably saved Crook from a disaster. Crook ran into Crazy Horse on the Rosebud while sipping tea when his scouts alerted him to the incoming Indian attack.

With the amount of fighting men he had, Crook should have inflicted much more damage than he did, expending over 25,000 cartridges and hitting only a dozen or so Indians. Had the battle of the Rusebud happened as it should have under a calculated cavalry encounter, Crazy Horse should have been beaten into submission. As it was, Crazy Horse was energized over that win and more determined than ever by the time the 7th Cavalry got to the Little Bighorn, that they had enough “Good Medicine” that they inflicted huge casualties against Custer.

You have the results of a double edged sword that was never brought to bear, being beaten by Crook, Crazy Horse would have been weakened substantially and would not have had the energy or the manpower to raise Hell with Custer. Imagine how different the Custer battle would have turned out had Crook done more than shoot up his ammunition then head back to Ft. Fetterman and go fishing...

similar thoughts thus the question on Crook.

The cavalry fight no one remembers; Kit Carson's punitive Colorado River campaign against the Kiowas and Comanches, 25th November 1864.

260 1st New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry and 72 Jicarilla Apache and Ute scouts vs. 1,200 Comanches and Kiowas who were defending their encampments. The battle has been mentioned by some as a textbook case of how to successfully extricate one's cavalry command in the face of an overwhelming force of Plains Indians.

The US Commander, Kit Carson, was an exceptional man. Age 55 at the time of the battle, he had first gone West at age 16 with a Rocky Mountain Fur Brigade and had since lived for nearly 40 years on the Far Frontier. Indeed for Carson, Adobe Walls was familiar ground as he had been employed there for a period of time by the Bent brothers twenty years previously, while in his thirties. Of Carson there were many stories told of his times with the Rocky Mountain Fur Trappers, as rough a crowd as has ever existed on this Continent. Although barely 5'6" in height, he killed his share of Indians in combat, and wooed his share of Indian maidens, winning the first in a duel with a French trapper.

After the decline of the fur trade in the 1840's Carson moved on to other employment, guiding John Charles Fremont on three Expeditions to California. In this bit from Wiki we get a glimpse of the man's character, then age 34 years of age. Shades of Woodrow and Gus, two rough men taking out after a superior number of cutthroats, simply because it was the right thing to do......

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kit_Carson#First_expedition,_1842

During this expedition, Frémont trekked into the Mojave Desert. His party met a Mexican man and boy. The two told Carson that Native Americans had ambushed their party of travelers. The male travelers were killed; the women travelers were staked to the ground, sexually mutilated, and killed. The murderers then stole the Mexicans' thirty horses. Carson and a mountain man friend named Alexis Godey went after the murderers. They took two days to find them. They rushed into their camp, killing and scalping two of the murderers. The stolen horses were recovered and returned to the Mexican man and boy.

Brief quote from the Texas History Online (UT Austin) account of the battle, notable because it is one of the few accounts that alludes to cattle. The Kiowas and Comanches got into stealing cattle along the Texas Frontier in a big way during the 1860's, transitioning to a pastoral economy, such that by the time of Carson's raid their camps were surrounded by large herds.....

https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qea01

Carson's destination was Adobe Walls, where he had been employed by Bent nearly twenty years earlier. After a delay caused by snowstorms the column set up camp for the night of November 24 at Mule Springs, in what is now Moore County, thirty miles west of Adobe Walls. Two of Carson's scouts reported the presence of a large group of Indians, who had recently moved into and around Adobe Walls with many horses and cattle. Carson immediately ordered all cavalry units and the two howitzers to move forward, leaving the infantry under Lt. Col. Francisco P. Abreau to follow later with the supply train. After covering fifteen miles Carson halted to await the dawn. No loud talking or fires were permitted, and a late-night frost added to the men's discomfort.

Comanches and Kiowas living by herding cattle. Doesn't fit the popular narrative so it has largely been discarded. Six years later in 1873, before they were finally cowed by Ranald MacKenzie in the Red River War, the then unbroken Comanches traded 30,000 head of Texas cattle to the Army at Fort Sumner. This shift to cattle too explains why Quanah Parker could transition so seamlessly into ranching following his final surrender.

Neither Carson nor his men had eaten since the night before, had spent a long day in the saddle, and had then remained on their feet all night in the intense late-November Panhandle cold. Of the origins and ethnicity of his 1st New Mexico Volunteers I can find no description, but it is unlikely that any were recent immigrants from Europe barely able to it a horse as Custer had to deal with.

Well here's a good account of the battle, you might notice that one thing Carson did that saved his life and those of his command; he knew enough to listen to his Indian Scouts.

https://truewestmagazine.com/did-kit-carson-win-at-adobe-walls/

George wishes he had waited for Benteen to catch up, kept his command together, and attacked into the southern end of the village with everything he had along the route he had Reno take.

Even this might not have worked but it was the best of the bad options. And if it didn't work, he could have made a fighting retreat in good order with his command together.

But with his command together he might have managed to cut off the village from the main horse herd (grazing west of the village). That leaves the women and kids fleeing afoot with the warriors trying to cover their flight on the one horse that a warrior often kept staked out close to his lodge. Fleeing afoot down river. Straight into the Terry-Gibbon column coming up river.

Given the numbers he was facing, George did not have enough men to be splitting his command up.

A small British detachment of about 130-140 held off an estimated 3000-4000 Zulus at Rorke's Drift using volley fire with single shot breech loaders from good defensive positions. I believe the Springfields could have done the job. But not for troopers with questionable fire discipline scattered out all over a grassy ridge in Montana.

And that's telling when it comes to cohesion, too.

Custer had a force of almost 700 against about 2500 Natives. Natives that were very brave but had had problems in the past coordinating their efforts. But Custer's force was split three ways. And the 200 or so that he had with him may not have been all that cohesive; the memorial stones marking the south skirmish line may be evidence of some cohesion but some of the other memorial stones are a bit haphazard on that ridge. The exception might be I Troop under Keogh. I Troop's memorial makers are close together. They seem to have rallied around a wounded Keogh and made a true last stand together.

Mutilation has been mentioned. It's notable that the ONLY body not mutilated at LBH by the Natives was the body of Captain Myles Keogh.

I agree. It pains me to say that because I'm not a Custer fan. But Elliot was reckless and Custer had to save his command. I believe he made the correct decision in that case. It's like a ship's captain having to seal a flooding compartment on a damaged ship where men might still be working in order to keep everyone from going down. Or, that scene in Master and Commander where Captain Aubrey has to cut a rope and leave a man to his death in the sea to save his ship.

Too funny. They'd probably consider it eco-terrorism or some such.

Benteen was sent on his scout hours before Custer and Benteen got to the Little Bighorn. His orders were to go on a scout to the South and West to see if any Indians had already started to leave the Little Bighorn valley. He was then supposed to come in support of Custer as he approached the Village from the East.

Custer sent 2 messengers to Benteen telling him to come in support of Custer, Kanipe and the bugler Martin. Both got their messages to Benteen and he still didn't get there in time.

Much has been shared here, but much hasn't been paid attention to either. To constantly bring up Custer's division of command as incompetent is further dispelled by the observation by General Nelson A. Miles who stated "The more I see of movement here (Little Big Horn Battlefield), the more I have admiration for Custer, and I am satisfied his like will not be found very soon again.”

Visiting the battlefield many times over the years I have become quite close to some of the staff, in particular, Steve Adelson ( https://www.amazon.com/Little-Bighorn-Voices-Distant-Wind/dp/0997933763) who will tell you that several if not many, Army officers with battle experience, have looked at the battlefield, the deployment by Custer and what happened before the battle and their observation is similar to Custer's.

It is too easy to armchair quarterback the loss and find the wrongs that were committed and not have a full understanding of the way of fighting Indians in the 1870's.

Several things keep getting brought up over and over and yet no one will listen or pay attention to the reason that these things happened:

Gatling guns; way to slow to go over rough terrain especially when pulled by condemned cavalry mounts. Deploying a Gatling gun in a moving assault as was typical in these types of engagements, just won't work even if you got them there.

Indians with repeating rifles; Yes they had Winchester 1866, Henry and probably even spencer repeaters, but there were less than 300 total that were in the possession of the Indians. The trapdoor Springfield was chosen for the Indian wars due to long range, sustained firepower in a skirmish line and they were powerful enough to put down a horse. This was enough to keep the Indians at bay on Reno/Benteen hill for the rest of that day and into the following day.

Custer and Washita; Custer did what he was ordered to do at the Washita and he didn't abandon Major Elliott, Major Elliott abandoned Custer and attacked without orders and support which cost him his and his command, their lives. Custer didn't abandon Elliot on the battlefield, he kept the rest of his command together as they retreated from another band of attacking Indians from another camp on the Washita.

Custer's Subordinate officers hated him; that is true of Benteen. His hatred for Custer is easily seen in letters he had written to his wife and others over the years as he served with Custer. Reno didn't like Custer either, but most of the rest of his officers were more than willing to follow him to their death. All Custers supporting officers with the 5 companies he had in his command were devoted and fearless and died that way. After Benteen finally got to Reno on the hill, Capt Weir tried to get to Custer to give him support as he knew they had been ordered to. He was pushed back by fierce Indian fire and never did get to Custer.

You also have to remember that Custer died a hero's death on June 25, 1876 and in a little more than 2 years he became the goat that everyone blamed for the disaster because he was not around to make his own case for what happened. Reno demanded the court of inquiry to clear his name, but conveniently waited until after the 2 years it would take to bring him up on any charges of insubordination had the inquiry been any sooner. The Army and officers all tried to stay as clean as they could and Custer got the blame.

General Terry's orders are saved and quite clear that he had given Custer the approval to do whatever he deemed necessary should he find the Indians. Even with the orders as clear as they are, people have tried to state that Custer didn't follow them.

Once you read the depositions at the Reno court of inquiry, you can see how Reno was lucky to escape with his rank. Enlisted men told of being coerced in testimony to make favorable statements of both Reno and Benteen during the court of inquiry. If you want to know more about those, you should pay particular attention to a witness, George Herendeen. Reno was later dishonorably discharged from the Army due to poor character and continued drunkenness.

We would all be talking about a different man had Custer survived the battle, but even with another 50 years of fighting for his sake, Libby Custer wasn't able to overcome myth and untruth to salvage one of the greatest Civil War General's life and accomplishments...

this thread has me listening to "The Last Stand" by Philbrick again. Its a good read/listen in my opinion. I'm only to the point where the battle is over and Reno is headed to Custer.
While I've never walked a mile in their shoes, Reno and Benteen come across as ineffectual leaders until pressed. While only one source, the book paints Reno as a drunkard and Benteen took a nap leaving his troops leaderless during a fight. Benteen also didn't have his troops dig in during the night and lulls until later.

Took the family to LBH Aug 2017. We all enjoyed it and I really wish I would've done more research prior to the visit. Even so, it puts perspective on the battlefield as I go thru the book.

Excellent post, shrapnel! I agree on all points. Just to add my dos centavos...



Quite right. Gatling guns were not offensive, but defensive weapons, were slow to move and even slower to deploy, thus not at all useful for a light cavalry outfit such as the 7th. Leaving the Gatling guns behind was eminently practical, from a movement/maneuver point of view. The gun and its carriage were as large and heavy as a field artillery piece.

Most folks have no idea just how rough the country was (and off-road, still is!) in Wyoming and Montana. It was hard enough just to move men and horses through that country, as the daily progress reports make clear. Dragging a thousand-pound gun carriage over roadless prairie, up and down ravines, across swollen streams (remember, it was a late, wet spring that year) behind a team of mules was back-breaking work for the gun crew and teamsters. And keep in mind that this country was so difficult to move in that the powers that be had implemented the "new" practice of using mule teams for the supply train, rather than wagons as had been the standard. This practice had been proven by Gen. Miles in his fights against the Apaches in the Southwest previously, but was untested elsewhere until the 1876 campaign. Moving supplies by wagon had been the Army's standard practice previously; it worked fine in the 1861-1865 conflict back east, where there were lots of roads, but it sucked balls on the prairies.




Quite so. The Springfield was a solid performer in this battle as well as in others. The problem was the ammunition, which tended to stick in hot chambers.



Benteen's criticism of Custer for "abandoning" Elliott at the Washita was completely unfounded. Custer barely escaped with the bulk of his command as it was. If he had attempted to rescue Elliott the outfit would most likely have been wiped out by vastly superior numbers of Cheyenne warriors, but it was clear from the records of the engagement that no one in Custer's command, including Benteen, had any clue where Elliott was, nor that he was in trouble.



Reno was, by most accounts, blind drunk from the beginning of the attack on the south end of the Indian village and forward. Benteen conducted the fight on "Reno Hill", not Reno, and he did a damn good job of it for the most part. The sally to aid Custer instigated by Weir and supported by Benteen turned out to be a dangerous and nearly fatal effort to the command. They were barely able to retreat back to Reno Hill, but thanks to excellent tactics and fire discipline they were able to effectively do so.

I'm aware of all this. And the controversy over Benteen, pro and con. And it's hard for me to take a firm position on whether or not Benteen's actions are reasonable or not given the circumstances he faced.



Thank you for Miles quote. I was not aware of it and now I will look further into it. But my general feeling about quotes like the one from Miles is that they can neither be dismissed nor accepted as gospel. On one hand the fact that Miles said it means it has to get serious consideration. On the other hand it's not at all hard to find two generals from any era (especially the Civil War era) who disagreed with each other. So just because Miles said it doesn't mean that it's so.



Understood. But, in my example given above of professional officers disagreeing, you could also probably get other modern combat arms officers to tour the battlefield who might disagree with Adelson. Adelson is plugging his book, after all.

Another simple example could be you and me. You've been there many times and I've been there twice. We've both seen and walked the ground and yet are coming to different ideas about how Custer used the ground and deployed his troops.



Yes, but I just love a good Custer discussion! Even if it's a Custer disagreement! Hopefully we can disagree without being disagreeable.



I strive to. I won't claim that I do but I strive to.



Custer was no coward. I don't doubt that he dies gallantly. But that doesn't mean that he might not have made some foolish, or at least imprudent, decisions that day.



"The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank."

There's the orders. I post them for further comment or discussion.



This would require a thread of it's own. Suffice it to say that points have been made pro and con about Reno the man and Reno's actions at LBH.



The fact that it's Libby Custer who is spending the rest of her life singing her husband's praises means that anything she says has to be scrutinized. She can hardly be considered objective.

He was by most accounts drunk on Reno Hill. He may or may not have been impaired earlier. I believe there is an eyewitness statement that says he took a pull from a flask before leading the attack into the valley? But I do believe there were conflicting statements about Reno's level of intoxication early on. The details of Reno's fight in the valley is one of the things on my list to dig further into. Most Custer books cover it in about one chapter. Recently a book came out dealing with just the valley fight and it looks to be a good one, albeit expensive:

Link: https://www.amazon.com/Where-Custer-Fight-Began-Undermanned/dp/0912783486/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1539889174&sr=1-1&keywords=reno%27s+valley+fight

It's on my list to acquire.

Edited: I can't get my link to work and I'm not sure why. But anyone interested can paste the link in or search Reno's Valley Fight. It really does look like a valuable book for the LBH obsessed.

Where Custers Fight Began

Thank you!

Custer sent 2 messengers to Benteen telling him to come in support of Custer, Kanipe and the bugler Martin. Both got their messages to Benteen and he still didn't get there in time.







Of Course, one must remember to put aside personal preferences and look at facts. I am mostly interested in what happened more than personalities. Benteen was a fantastic soldier, capable beyond what most of his contemporaries were and I learned that after reading all the accounts from people that knew or corresponded with him. As a result, I have the greatest admiration for him as a soldier. The facts still show that two messengers told him of the urgency to come in support of Custer and he never made it.

Boston Custer was with the pack train at he time Benteen made it back to Reno Creek, and Boston made it back to Custer with plenty of time to die with him and Benteen didn't.



The quote is to validate from the perspective of a seasoned Indian fighter, that Custer wasn't incompetent, yet many revisionists still make that claim.




Steve didn't say that the officers agreed with him, he remarked how they were not at odds with Custer's handling of the battle. The link is just to show Steve has done considerable research himself on Custer and the battle, his perspective may not be consistent with mine, but he does know about the battle. This is used as reference only to avoid sounding like I am without resources.



This is more true of the Court of Inquiry as these guys testifying were coerced in many cases and also had recanted their versions of the battle 2 years after the fact. If you don't think there was a cover up, you need to read how those testimonials changed. That is why the version by George Herendeen is so poignant, he was a seasoned veteran scout form the 1874 expedition.

He had encountered the Sioux and Cheyenne when they left Bozeman in 1874 with the mission to stir up hostilities with the Indians to bring more forts to the Bozeman Trail. On that trip with less than 160 men, they fought the Sioux much of that time and even a skirmish or 2 with the Cheyenne and they made it back to Bozeman with only a couple casualties. He saved about a dozen troops down on the river when Reno retreated back onto the hilltop. He told them then, he had been in worse scrapes than this, and if they did what he told them he would get them to safety. He did just that.

That does indeed look like another book I have to acquire. If that makes me LBH-obsessed, so be it!

I raised the issue of Reno's intoxication has been raised a number of times by several authors, citing eyewitness reports. By those accounts, he started drinking immediately after receiving Custer's order to attack the southern end of the village, and he was observed drinking liquor from a bottle at several points during the fight.

This was of little import at the time, as histories of 19th century warfare show it was considered normal for officers to drink liquor before, during, and after battle. However: Reno's drinking was clearly beyond the pale, as related by surviving participants in the Valley Fight and the defense of Reno Hill. His conduct of the retreat from the valley to the trees and thereafter across the river appears to have been affected adversely by drink, and then on the hill Benteen was forced by circumstance to organize the defenses.

i ran across this on another forum, on the battle on the rosebud. what caught my eye was the statement crook was only 25 miles from custer when he turned around. it's discussing some 44.40 bullets found at the rosebud and henry/winchester rifles used. some which through the bullets were probably at both battles.
And again with the word coverup, i think a lot of people were covering their backsides from grant all the way down. I still have not come to grips with crook doing what he did.
https://www.44winchestercenterfirec...XoI6MP5aHclDz7Mv8EVYglcprQ9aiPjeHfxuY3C0

I'm a bit puzzled by the question of Benteen's tardiness as well. There were some legitimate excuses for this, perhaps. Benteen certainly seemed to loiter at several points in the march, according to several witnesses, but to what extent that was material is questionable.

Boston Custer was a lone rider, capable of covering ground much more quickly than a cavalry troop with pack animals and some of its men on foot, and much, much faster than a pack train of mules.

birdperson, if you ever get interested fremont was the governor of arizona way back when, his house in open for touring at the charlotte hall museum in prescott, something really worth visiting. lots of stuff in there from the early days. My issue in a way is seeing a lot of the pictures on the walls and actually either meeting them as a kid or knowing of them through my father.
I think perhaps some of the stuff i have accumulated will end up in there some day.
Carson has a special spot for his treatment of the navajo's on the long walk.

It is no use to try and suggest what Benteen thought, but he did take too much time to get into the battle. He spent too much time watering horses and although he may not be as fleet as a single mounted man such as Boston Custer, he was a seasoned Cavalry officer and should be able to proceed with haste especially after being told to come quickly.

Peter Thompson testified at the Court of Inquiry and stated how he and another trooper with only one horse between them, had gone down the Little Bighorn looking for a route of escape and saw Custer up on the hill for a period of 15 minutes or more without engaging the Indians.

Some may suspect he was mistaken or lying, but he was one of the Medal of Honor recipients for getting water back up the hill to Reno/Benteen site.

Had Custer waited as Thompson states, it would seem to me that Custer could have been waiting for Benteen...

I read that the first message carried by Sergeant Daniel Kanipe was delivered to Captain McDougall,
commander of the pack train guard. ...and the second message carried by Private John Martin went to Benteen.

the message conveyed by Custer to Martin was verbal effectively instructing Benteen to bring his battalion forward
with the pack train ASAP. .... then Adjutant Cooke stopped broken-english Giovanni Martini and scribbled a written
message for him to take ;

."Benteen.
Come On. Big Village. Be quick. Bring Packs.
P.S. Bring packs. W.W. Cooke"

Benteen in the course of responding to Custers orders through Martin, then ran into Renos retreating
and badly damaged battalion. Reno desperately requested Benteen haul up and assist him with his
on the back foot situation.

In the course of assisting Reno, shots were heard from Custers direction....Weir requested permission
to respond but was denied by Reno....Weir and his company decided to go anyway, followed by Benteen
and his battalion.

My understanding is that contact with the pack train has not yet been made at this point.

The order from Custer/Cooke/Martin was for Benteen to bring the packs (from the train?) ..which I gather
was about Custer wanting to have vital ammunition supply.

Question;

was Benteen going with Weir toward Custers location without the pack train a violation of Custers orders?.
...strictly speaking, should he have first located-joined with the pack train before attempting to head toward Custer..?
(the rather brief message shows 'bring packs' being mentioned twice, thus deemed important or vital)
.. now would doing so effectively mean even more delay?... meaning Custer would still be screwed?

********
********

Custers first (verbal only) order that Kanipe delivered to the mule train was not directly from Custer to Kanipe
but was relayed to Kanipe by Sergeant Finkle, with whom he was riding.

The message was allegedly this:

"Tell McDougall to bring the pack train straight across to high ground -- if packs get loose
don't stop to fix them, cut them off. Come quick. Big Indian camp."

I can agree with the last part of this but not the first part. At least not to the extent that is usually alleged. I believe Reno actually made some good decisions in the valley. Some not so good decisions too, but still not a total incompetent.

Reno recognized he did not have enough men to carry the charge through (similar to a penetration attack in modern terms) and chose to skirmish (similar to a holding attack in modern terms). He also recognized that he was about to be encircled and said, "We've got to charge them!" And then he led it. He didn't lead a retreat, he led an attack. When you are encircled, any direction you go is attacking into the enemy. Reno did this and he did it with Bloody Knife's brains on his face. And the military maneuver known today as a breakout from encirclement is one of the most difficult maneuvers to pull off in good order. Historically, it's often chaos.

"The danger in any attempt to break out of an encirclement is that the troops, or at least a large portion of them, will loose their cohesion, and a mentality of "Save yourself at all costs!" takes over" - Order in Chaos: Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops by Hermann Balck

There is some testimony that Reno could have done a few things to handle the breakout better but he did recognize the necessity of breaking out and he did lead the attack out. But the initial good decision to breakout and then leading by example started to falter crossing the river and became a mess going up the hill. Once on the hill, Reno seemed to break down when Benteen arrived and let him handle the defense while self medicating.

Sergeant Kanipe’s message:

The message courier Kanipe was bearing was this, "Go to Capt. McDougall [heading the pack train] Tell him to bring the pack train straight across country. If any packs come loose, cut them [off] and come on quick - a big Indian camp. If you see Capt. Benteen, tell him to come on quick - a big Indian camp." Sgt. Kanipe did come across Benteen, who had abandoned his mission and decided to follow the trail of the main portion of the regiment. Delivering his message - "They want you up there as quick as you can get there - they have struck a big Indian camp." - at approx. 3:42, he rode on with a shout of, "We've got them, boys!" Prior to this meeting, he had been passed by a group of Arikara scouts leading a small bunch of captured Sioux ponies. Not sure if they were friend or foe, he loaded his gun and readied to fire. About six minutes after meeting with Benteen, he finally met up with, and joined, the pack train.

Separate from those orders, moving forward to what we have been investigating, our research continued with accounts from the Indian scouts east of the battlefield.

The Arikara Scouts were relieved of their duty and told to steal Sioux and Cheyenne ponies to further cause chaos to the Indian village. When some of those scouts arrived back near the Lone Teepee, they observed 2 troopers that had escaped the battle and were surrounded by Sioux warriors. The scouts didn’t see the Sioux kill the troopers but guessed that they had.

This is where we have been looking for evidence of those 2 soldiers and a cache of personal belongings taken from the dead at Last Stand Hill.

For anyone who thinks Reno must have been a total incompetent for the way he handled things in the timber, this seems to be about how smooth a breakout from encirclement usually goes:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q76fAWLiC9w&list=PLDE15335705F81B78&index=2

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbxPTfqmUzw&index=3&list=PLDE15335705F81B78

The action starts in the first clip at about 6:25 and continues into the second clip until about 2:10

In case I haven't made it clear enough, I just love this thread! Even the posts that disagree with me!

That's one of my favorite books I own

I've walked a lot of battlefields in this nation. None felt more powerful or left a stronger impression on me than Little Bighorn.

I really would like to own that first edition book as it was signed by Custer to Liza, his black cook, but as I said before it has a price tag of $25,000.00. I do at least have an autograph of his...

Way cool!

Shrapnel,

Thanks for all the information you share on this topic. Interesting and insightful to say the least.

I think that is a fair alternative explanation. Depending on whose account you read, you can take it either way. I'd like to believe your explanation, as I have formed a generally favorable view of Reno as a man and as an officer prior to LBH. His conduct of the long scout up the Rosebud in the weeks prior--which Custer was unfairly critical of, btw--shows Reno to have been more than competent as a commander, and of course his Civil War record was excellent.

Your point is quite true: a breakout from encirclement can be chaotic, especially when undertaken by undisciplined/ill-trained soldiers, which describes a large proportion of the 7th Cavalry accurately. Reno's command to stop the charge short of the village may have been wise from a self-preservation standpoint, but it was not tactically sound: the village was out of range of their Springfield carbines, and there was no cover adequate to a defensive engagement. Even the Hunkpapa Sioux, who would have been the tribe hit by his charge if continued, admitted in the aftermath that they were completely unprepared and that the charge, if carried through, would have shattered and scattered them.

Nonetheless, the fact that Reno was drunk in the Valley Fight is undisputed. Dr. Henry Porter attested that Reno was drinking heavily well before the advance on the village, Pvt. William Taylor attested that Reno was slurring drunk at the beginning of the charge and actually conducted at least the beginning of the charge with a bottle of "amber-colored liquid" (presumably whiskey or brandy) in his hand. And his dissolution into panic following the death of Blood Knife is well documented: at this point he was unmanned, according to many witnesses. Capt. Thomas French attested that shortly after Bloody Knife's brains were blown all over him, Reno suddenly mounted his horse and fled out of the timber and into the river accompanied by the shouted command "Every man for himself!"

That is really cool.

Your contributions to it are appreciated.

Thompson's account is unique, and although disputed/dismissed by some historians, I believe it is true. I agree, Custer was almost certainly waiting for Benteen. If Benteen had arrived in a timely manner, who knows what the outcome might have been that day?

In my opinion, even with Benteen's force added to his own, Custer probably would have been wiped out given the overwhelming odds against him at the north end of the village. The retreat from the ford to Last Stand hill seems to have been a rout rather than an organized withdrawal, based on the evidence uncovered by researchers in the past couple of decades... but would it have been more organized with Benteen's men added to the command? Perhaps it would. But they had nowhere to withdraw to. Last Stand Hill is no more defensible than Reno Hill (and some would argue less so). Assuming Benteen had joined Custer, could this have resulted in a protracted seige on the hilltop that was survivable by most of Custer's men? This question has intrigued me for a long time.

But this possibility, tantalizing though it may be, begs the question of what would have happened to Reno's command. Without Benteen's D and H Troops to augment Reno's battered troops, and more importantly Benteen himself present to assume command of the defense from Reno, would it not seem probable that Troops A, B, G, K, and M have been massacred to the last man on Reno Hill? I suspect they would have, in which case we would have a scenario in which the massacre of Custer's command was traded for the massacre of Reno's command.

In this case the aftermath would have been quite different from the debacle faced by Reno, Benteen, and the other officers in 1877-80. Custer, alive to defend himself, may well have become the noble hero in the national consciousness he thought himself to be, and he may well have become the Democratic presidential nominee at the July convention, and would almost certainly have been elected President. Reno would be dead, of course, and there would be no one to denounce him as a drunkard and an inept commander, so he would most likley have become a national hero. And Benteen, well, Benteen... he was always the fly in Custer's ointment, wasn't he? The wild card? Would Benteen's press connections have shattered the Custer myth?

I think that unlikely, if Custer had survived the battle. Terry and Sheridan would have done their utmost to cast the LBH battle in a favorable light to Custer and to themselves. Benteen's criticisms, if any, would have been suppressed by higher command. And let's face it, if Benteen had comported himself in that hypothetical fight as well as he did on Reno Hill, he would have been lauded as a hero along with Custer, and he would hardly have turned down a Medal of Honor or a promotion to higher rank, would he?

If Benteen had arrived in time, I believe Custer might have survived. And if he had survived, I believe Custer would have become the 19th President of the United States.

That is supposing they all ran to the top of last stand hill and took a defensive position. Custer, by this time could already be dead. Benteen getting there in a timely fashion would have made it so that there would not have been a last stand hill as we know it today. Custer was not a passive fighter and just wasn't his nature to defend, but to advance. With Benteen in support, the charge to the village would have been much more plausible and that is all Custer needed to do, get to the village and capture non-combatants and the war is over.



There is nothing in Custer's memoirs or character that would lead you to believe he had any aspiration to be President. He did get involved in politics at a point in his life and it wasn't Custeresque. I believe Custer, had he survived, would have still pursued a military career, hoping to regain his stature during the Civil War. He would have been at his best continuing with the Indian wars and with time and seasoning, may have been able to deal with a more sedentary life, which wasn't typical of Custer's energy.

Custer did enjoy the fast social life of dignitaries and friends in high places, but he didn't show signs of wanting the presidency...

Yeah, I sometimes let my imagination run away with me... But the fact that people still argue about Custer's political aspirations makes thinking about it interesting.

This doesn't give much credibility to a Cavalry leader, which also taints my opinion of Reno and his handling of the retreat, which is better classified as a rout.

The whole reason Reno pushed for the Court of Inquiry was to clear his name, as he was maligned for years after the battle for his actions. Had his troops been satisfied that he had done what he could, there would not have been the need to clear his name. He died with that dark cloud of drunkenness and incompetence hanging over his head. He was dishonorably discharged and died as a drunk with no regard for his military career.

In 1967 Reno's family requested a review of his Court Martial and they overturned his Dishonorable Discharge to Honorable. He is buried at the Custer Battlefield and is within a few feet of the flag flying in the cemetery. In respect of his service in the military I have no issue with his burial, but I do raise an eyebrow when revisionism creeps in to change a decision about his character and actions by 20th century standards...

I grew up in Minnesota where little crows war was waged.

There are markers all through the county where an attack occurred.

I was enamooured with the Sioux Indians as a child. Last year I started reading " The heart of everything that is" by Bob Drury and Tom Calvin.

This is the " Untold Story of Red Cloud".

In my opinion if this book is true makes Red Cloud look much like Jack the Ripper. I quit reading it because it was so gruesome.

The book also states the Sioux believed that what there physical shape of their body was before death , is how they would live eternity. Hence their fear for being sliced up by a saber.

They believed mutilations to be most effective need to be done on a living enemy.

I have never been 2 the Little Bighorn. I have a good friend Who was a crew chief on a gunship helicopter in Vietnam. When he visited the Little Bighorn he said the way the graves are marked looked much like what they would see when the South Vietnamese were overrun by the North. In battles in Cambodia.

It would not have been a good career move in the Army of that time to give the appearance of lusting after the Presidency. “ Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence “.

You may be right.

All bird dogs are dogs, but all dogs are not bird dogs...

I continue to only agree partially. I stand by me earlier statement that it was a breakout from encirclement and not a retreat in the usual sense that we think of retreat (the enemy is in front of us and we're a-running scared the other way). I think it truly was a breakout as the Army defines it, that it had to happen because Reno was given a difficult task and not enough men to accomplish it, and at some point Reno became OBE (overtaken/overcome by events) beyond his control.

But it is fair to say that Reno's breakout was not well organized and it pretty much became chaos about the time they crossed the river and headed up the hill. The thing about a breakout is that you begin by attacking straight into the enemy and at some point you punch through. So it goes through stages where the enemy is in front of you, then to both flanks, and then behind you. Once the enemy is behind you, you need to fight a rear guard. But the rest of your force might still be fighting through break point of the encirclement. So it's a difficult thing to coordinate.

One of the reasons I'm looking forward to the book I referenced in an earlier post is that the author focuses on the details of the valley fight and apparently (from the intro on Amazon), makes "a compelling case in Reno's favor." I'm curious to see what the author puts forward given that so many other authors have denigrated Reno.

You still have to understand the reason for Reno’s reputation was because of Reno, not circumstances. If only one person reported what happened at that battle and if that person had been Reno, there wouldn’t have been the need for a Court of Inquiry to clear his name. It was because of his actions that surviving witnesses impugned Reno’s integrity.

You also have to be realistic and question Reno’s leadership when “every man for himself” was his way of handling that debacle. Until the desperate attempt to flee the river bottom, only a couple soldiers had been killed. A scramble with no leadership to get to the top of the hill to safety falls directly on Reno’s shoulders.

Worse than all of that, once they had gotten refuge on top of the hill, Reno had considered abandoning all the wounded to make an escape. This is not the thoughts of an effective leader. He was still rattled so badly that once Benteen got there he had to take charge because Reno was not at all in control.

These are indications of Reno’s incompetence...

I've always figured Reno doomed the attack to failure before Custer could even engage. I feel Reno failed Custer and Benteen did nothing to actually help the assault.

I am about 90% through "son of the morning star" lots of information on the players.
About read out i flipped on youtube and used search word "rosebud"
which took me to a channel from the rosebud reservation.
buried within the various videos was one for a soldier lost overseas, returning home. Something to watch.
they buried him, and something seeing the american flags, and vets from various conflicts. Watch another video of some kind of
outdoor circle center, lot of indians in costume, and a whole line of vets from various conflicts.
strange, reading of sitting bull, wounded knee, custer, and then watch those veterans from various conflicts.

Custer sent Benteen on reconnaissance south to investigate the upper valley.. He was also instructed to engage
or “pitch into” indians he may encounter...nobody can accuse Benteen of not following that order from Custer.

I am assuming the order Benteen didn’t follow was not coming to Custer’s aid when he had been told by Seargeant Kanipe and Martini the bugler when they told Benteen of the urgency to come in support of Custer.

Does "Come quick and bring packs" mean anything to you?

apparently Custer hurriedly despatched those two brief messages just before he began his assault.

Benteen actually hastened his pace by deciding not to wait any longer for the requested pack train.
Had he waited to bring such along, its likely he would have been accused of being even slower
in coming to Custers assistance.

Stop and wait for the pack train...OR carry on without it......which would Custer have preferred
if he wanted Benteen there ASAP..??



Its hard to say precisely what Custers actual situation was from the two brief messages he sent.

On the surface it could sound like Custer wants to attack, but is anxiously waiting for Benteens battalion
and ammunition from the pack train before doing so.

If Custer was already in a rapid running battle when he sent messages, why the stressed need for the pack train?
ie; how would ammunition from the pack train be distributed to those troops?... Thus it could make one think
that the repeated request for the pack train in Custers short messages ,simply means Custer is on the verge
or brink of conducting a preperatory attack, but no such action is yet in progress.

It seems to me that many people want to cut Reno slack for his conduct of the Valley Fight, and I'm not sure why. He was drunk. He halted a charge that had every chance of succeeding and potentially routing the Hunkpapa village, and did so at a position that made absolutely no tactical sense--out in the open with no cover and out of rifle range of the village. He then ordered a withdrawal to the timber along the riverbank, but made no effort to organize that withdrawal, and then once in the timber, "led" (more appropriately instigated) the rout across the river and up the hill, again with no effort to organize an orderly withdrawal. (The fact that such a maneuver was a well-established tactic in the 7th was demonstrated by Benteen and Weir during their withdrawal from Weir Hill later that same afternoon, as an example.)

Reno had been devastated by the death of his wife the previous year, and then by Terry's refusal to grant him leave to travel back East to bury her and attend his children. He had been drinking heavily since then--and this was in an outfit that was known for heavy drinking as a matter of course, such that standing out as a particularly heavy drinking officer suggests toxic alcoholism. Are we to excuse his crucial failures in the Valley Fight and on Reno Hill because of this? Considering the loss of life within his own command, it is difficult to do so, in my view.

Consider this: if Reno had carried through on the charge into the Hunkpapa tipi circle, the course of the battle would have been very different. Large numbers of non-combatants could have been taken hostage--which was the proven tactic for "winning" an Indian fight, as demonstrated by Custer at the Washita, among many other examples--although this would probably have only taken some of the Hunkpapa warriors out of the fight, at most.

More likely, the havoc Reno would have created in a fight among the Hunkpapa tipis would have drawn many of the warriors away from the north end of the village. This would undoubtedly have resulted in many casualties to his command, but in conducting such a vociferous and organized assault he would assuredly have reduced the number of warriors available to attack Custer's battalion before he could capture the large number of women and children fleeing out of the north end of the village.

Too many critics of Custer point to his decision to split his command. They fail to grasp the fact that the objective was NOT to engage the Sioux/Cheyenne warriors in pitched battle, but rather it was to capture noncombatant hostages and thereby force a surrender of a numerically superior force. As such, dividing the command was exactly the right thing to do. Had Reno done his part effectively the casualties would have been significant, but most likely not as severe as Reno's men sustained in the battle as recorded by history; and Custer would have been able to win the overall battle by achieving his stated objective, i.e., capturing hostages to force capitulation.