Home Forums Hunting & Shooting Hunter's Campfire General Custer's remains.

Crook is interesting to me in the calvary had a base near yarnell/congress in arizona. they at one time had a bunch of indians holed up there.
My mother lived at a trading post in the 20's near there that belonged to the family. they did have indian customers.
lots of stories about those days.
evidently crook was considered special by the indians.

I was at the Custer Battlefield a couple weeks ago. Powerful place. I was thinking of bringing some old spent cartridge cases and tossing them about. I wonder if that would of been illegal. This is a great thread, I hope it can continue. I went to Pompeys pillar the same day. I always thought in my own head that the pillar and Clarks name sorta signifies the 'beginning of the end' of the western Indian horse culture and the battlefield, not too far away signifies the 'End'. I was surprised at some of the tourists at the battlefield, wouldn't do any walking on the paths 'cuz they were afraid of snakes or it was to rugged down towards the river.

I remember being there and hearing the dry "shukka, shukka" all along the paths. I also felt some sort of "historical presence" that I cannot adequately explain, but it was very real.

Not from a historical point of view, but more as an observer, I don’t know why Crook wasn’t held more accountable for what he didn’t do. Crook had almost 1,000 men with him and a mass of Indian scouts that probably saved Crook from a disaster. Crook ran into Crazy Horse on the Rosebud while sipping tea when his scouts alerted him to the incoming Indian attack.

With the amount of fighting men he had, Crook should have inflicted much more damage than he did, expending over 25,000 cartridges and hitting only a dozen or so Indians. Had the battle of the Rusebud happened as it should have under a calculated cavalry encounter, Crazy Horse should have been beaten into submission. As it was, Crazy Horse was energized over that win and more determined than ever by the time the 7th Cavalry got to the Little Bighorn, that they had enough “Good Medicine” that they inflicted huge casualties against Custer.

You have the results of a double edged sword that was never brought to bear, being beaten by Crook, Crazy Horse would have been weakened substantially and would not have had the energy or the manpower to raise Hell with Custer. Imagine how different the Custer battle would have turned out had Crook done more than shoot up his ammunition then head back to Ft. Fetterman and go fishing...

similar thoughts thus the question on Crook.

The cavalry fight no one remembers; Kit Carson's punitive Colorado River campaign against the Kiowas and Comanches, 25th November 1864.

260 1st New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry and 72 Jicarilla Apache and Ute scouts vs. 1,200 Comanches and Kiowas who were defending their encampments. The battle has been mentioned by some as a textbook case of how to successfully extricate one's cavalry command in the face of an overwhelming force of Plains Indians.

The US Commander, Kit Carson, was an exceptional man. Age 55 at the time of the battle, he had first gone West at age 16 with a Rocky Mountain Fur Brigade and had since lived for nearly 40 years on the Far Frontier. Indeed for Carson, Adobe Walls was familiar ground as he had been employed there for a period of time by the Bent brothers twenty years previously, while in his thirties. Of Carson there were many stories told of his times with the Rocky Mountain Fur Trappers, as rough a crowd as has ever existed on this Continent. Although barely 5'6" in height, he killed his share of Indians in combat, and wooed his share of Indian maidens, winning the first in a duel with a French trapper.

After the decline of the fur trade in the 1840's Carson moved on to other employment, guiding John Charles Fremont on three Expeditions to California. In this bit from Wiki we get a glimpse of the man's character, then age 34 years of age. Shades of Woodrow and Gus, two rough men taking out after a superior number of cutthroats, simply because it was the right thing to do......

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kit_Carson#First_expedition,_1842

During this expedition, Frémont trekked into the Mojave Desert. His party met a Mexican man and boy. The two told Carson that Native Americans had ambushed their party of travelers. The male travelers were killed; the women travelers were staked to the ground, sexually mutilated, and killed. The murderers then stole the Mexicans' thirty horses. Carson and a mountain man friend named Alexis Godey went after the murderers. They took two days to find them. They rushed into their camp, killing and scalping two of the murderers. The stolen horses were recovered and returned to the Mexican man and boy.

Brief quote from the Texas History Online (UT Austin) account of the battle, notable because it is one of the few accounts that alludes to cattle. The Kiowas and Comanches got into stealing cattle along the Texas Frontier in a big way during the 1860's, transitioning to a pastoral economy, such that by the time of Carson's raid their camps were surrounded by large herds.....

https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/qea01

Carson's destination was Adobe Walls, where he had been employed by Bent nearly twenty years earlier. After a delay caused by snowstorms the column set up camp for the night of November 24 at Mule Springs, in what is now Moore County, thirty miles west of Adobe Walls. Two of Carson's scouts reported the presence of a large group of Indians, who had recently moved into and around Adobe Walls with many horses and cattle. Carson immediately ordered all cavalry units and the two howitzers to move forward, leaving the infantry under Lt. Col. Francisco P. Abreau to follow later with the supply train. After covering fifteen miles Carson halted to await the dawn. No loud talking or fires were permitted, and a late-night frost added to the men's discomfort.

Comanches and Kiowas living by herding cattle. Doesn't fit the popular narrative so it has largely been discarded. Six years later in 1873, before they were finally cowed by Ranald MacKenzie in the Red River War, the then unbroken Comanches traded 30,000 head of Texas cattle to the Army at Fort Sumner. This shift to cattle too explains why Quanah Parker could transition so seamlessly into ranching following his final surrender.

Neither Carson nor his men had eaten since the night before, had spent a long day in the saddle, and had then remained on their feet all night in the intense late-November Panhandle cold. Of the origins and ethnicity of his 1st New Mexico Volunteers I can find no description, but it is unlikely that any were recent immigrants from Europe barely able to it a horse as Custer had to deal with.

Well here's a good account of the battle, you might notice that one thing Carson did that saved his life and those of his command; he knew enough to listen to his Indian Scouts.

https://truewestmagazine.com/did-kit-carson-win-at-adobe-walls/

George wishes he had waited for Benteen to catch up, kept his command together, and attacked into the southern end of the village with everything he had along the route he had Reno take.

Even this might not have worked but it was the best of the bad options. And if it didn't work, he could have made a fighting retreat in good order with his command together.

But with his command together he might have managed to cut off the village from the main horse herd (grazing west of the village). That leaves the women and kids fleeing afoot with the warriors trying to cover their flight on the one horse that a warrior often kept staked out close to his lodge. Fleeing afoot down river. Straight into the Terry-Gibbon column coming up river.

Given the numbers he was facing, George did not have enough men to be splitting his command up.

A small British detachment of about 130-140 held off an estimated 3000-4000 Zulus at Rorke's Drift using volley fire with single shot breech loaders from good defensive positions. I believe the Springfields could have done the job. But not for troopers with questionable fire discipline scattered out all over a grassy ridge in Montana.

And that's telling when it comes to cohesion, too.

Custer had a force of almost 700 against about 2500 Natives. Natives that were very brave but had had problems in the past coordinating their efforts. But Custer's force was split three ways. And the 200 or so that he had with him may not have been all that cohesive; the memorial stones marking the south skirmish line may be evidence of some cohesion but some of the other memorial stones are a bit haphazard on that ridge. The exception might be I Troop under Keogh. I Troop's memorial makers are close together. They seem to have rallied around a wounded Keogh and made a true last stand together.

Mutilation has been mentioned. It's notable that the ONLY body not mutilated at LBH by the Natives was the body of Captain Myles Keogh.

I agree. It pains me to say that because I'm not a Custer fan. But Elliot was reckless and Custer had to save his command. I believe he made the correct decision in that case. It's like a ship's captain having to seal a flooding compartment on a damaged ship where men might still be working in order to keep everyone from going down. Or, that scene in Master and Commander where Captain Aubrey has to cut a rope and leave a man to his death in the sea to save his ship.

Too funny. They'd probably consider it eco-terrorism or some such.

Benteen was sent on his scout hours before Custer and Benteen got to the Little Bighorn. His orders were to go on a scout to the South and West to see if any Indians had already started to leave the Little Bighorn valley. He was then supposed to come in support of Custer as he approached the Village from the East.

Custer sent 2 messengers to Benteen telling him to come in support of Custer, Kanipe and the bugler Martin. Both got their messages to Benteen and he still didn't get there in time.

Much has been shared here, but much hasn't been paid attention to either. To constantly bring up Custer's division of command as incompetent is further dispelled by the observation by General Nelson A. Miles who stated "The more I see of movement here (Little Big Horn Battlefield), the more I have admiration for Custer, and I am satisfied his like will not be found very soon again.”

Visiting the battlefield many times over the years I have become quite close to some of the staff, in particular, Steve Adelson ( https://www.amazon.com/Little-Bighorn-Voices-Distant-Wind/dp/0997933763) who will tell you that several if not many, Army officers with battle experience, have looked at the battlefield, the deployment by Custer and what happened before the battle and their observation is similar to Custer's.

It is too easy to armchair quarterback the loss and find the wrongs that were committed and not have a full understanding of the way of fighting Indians in the 1870's.

Several things keep getting brought up over and over and yet no one will listen or pay attention to the reason that these things happened:

Gatling guns; way to slow to go over rough terrain especially when pulled by condemned cavalry mounts. Deploying a Gatling gun in a moving assault as was typical in these types of engagements, just won't work even if you got them there.

Indians with repeating rifles; Yes they had Winchester 1866, Henry and probably even spencer repeaters, but there were less than 300 total that were in the possession of the Indians. The trapdoor Springfield was chosen for the Indian wars due to long range, sustained firepower in a skirmish line and they were powerful enough to put down a horse. This was enough to keep the Indians at bay on Reno/Benteen hill for the rest of that day and into the following day.

Custer and Washita; Custer did what he was ordered to do at the Washita and he didn't abandon Major Elliott, Major Elliott abandoned Custer and attacked without orders and support which cost him his and his command, their lives. Custer didn't abandon Elliot on the battlefield, he kept the rest of his command together as they retreated from another band of attacking Indians from another camp on the Washita.

Custer's Subordinate officers hated him; that is true of Benteen. His hatred for Custer is easily seen in letters he had written to his wife and others over the years as he served with Custer. Reno didn't like Custer either, but most of the rest of his officers were more than willing to follow him to their death. All Custers supporting officers with the 5 companies he had in his command were devoted and fearless and died that way. After Benteen finally got to Reno on the hill, Capt Weir tried to get to Custer to give him support as he knew they had been ordered to. He was pushed back by fierce Indian fire and never did get to Custer.

You also have to remember that Custer died a hero's death on June 25, 1876 and in a little more than 2 years he became the goat that everyone blamed for the disaster because he was not around to make his own case for what happened. Reno demanded the court of inquiry to clear his name, but conveniently waited until after the 2 years it would take to bring him up on any charges of insubordination had the inquiry been any sooner. The Army and officers all tried to stay as clean as they could and Custer got the blame.

General Terry's orders are saved and quite clear that he had given Custer the approval to do whatever he deemed necessary should he find the Indians. Even with the orders as clear as they are, people have tried to state that Custer didn't follow them.

Once you read the depositions at the Reno court of inquiry, you can see how Reno was lucky to escape with his rank. Enlisted men told of being coerced in testimony to make favorable statements of both Reno and Benteen during the court of inquiry. If you want to know more about those, you should pay particular attention to a witness, George Herendeen. Reno was later dishonorably discharged from the Army due to poor character and continued drunkenness.

We would all be talking about a different man had Custer survived the battle, but even with another 50 years of fighting for his sake, Libby Custer wasn't able to overcome myth and untruth to salvage one of the greatest Civil War General's life and accomplishments...

this thread has me listening to "The Last Stand" by Philbrick again. Its a good read/listen in my opinion. I'm only to the point where the battle is over and Reno is headed to Custer.
While I've never walked a mile in their shoes, Reno and Benteen come across as ineffectual leaders until pressed. While only one source, the book paints Reno as a drunkard and Benteen took a nap leaving his troops leaderless during a fight. Benteen also didn't have his troops dig in during the night and lulls until later.

Took the family to LBH Aug 2017. We all enjoyed it and I really wish I would've done more research prior to the visit. Even so, it puts perspective on the battlefield as I go thru the book.

Excellent post, shrapnel! I agree on all points. Just to add my dos centavos...



Quite right. Gatling guns were not offensive, but defensive weapons, were slow to move and even slower to deploy, thus not at all useful for a light cavalry outfit such as the 7th. Leaving the Gatling guns behind was eminently practical, from a movement/maneuver point of view. The gun and its carriage were as large and heavy as a field artillery piece.

Most folks have no idea just how rough the country was (and off-road, still is!) in Wyoming and Montana. It was hard enough just to move men and horses through that country, as the daily progress reports make clear. Dragging a thousand-pound gun carriage over roadless prairie, up and down ravines, across swollen streams (remember, it was a late, wet spring that year) behind a team of mules was back-breaking work for the gun crew and teamsters. And keep in mind that this country was so difficult to move in that the powers that be had implemented the "new" practice of using mule teams for the supply train, rather than wagons as had been the standard. This practice had been proven by Gen. Miles in his fights against the Apaches in the Southwest previously, but was untested elsewhere until the 1876 campaign. Moving supplies by wagon had been the Army's standard practice previously; it worked fine in the 1861-1865 conflict back east, where there were lots of roads, but it sucked balls on the prairies.




Quite so. The Springfield was a solid performer in this battle as well as in others. The problem was the ammunition, which tended to stick in hot chambers.



Benteen's criticism of Custer for "abandoning" Elliott at the Washita was completely unfounded. Custer barely escaped with the bulk of his command as it was. If he had attempted to rescue Elliott the outfit would most likely have been wiped out by vastly superior numbers of Cheyenne warriors, but it was clear from the records of the engagement that no one in Custer's command, including Benteen, had any clue where Elliott was, nor that he was in trouble.



Reno was, by most accounts, blind drunk from the beginning of the attack on the south end of the Indian village and forward. Benteen conducted the fight on "Reno Hill", not Reno, and he did a damn good job of it for the most part. The sally to aid Custer instigated by Weir and supported by Benteen turned out to be a dangerous and nearly fatal effort to the command. They were barely able to retreat back to Reno Hill, but thanks to excellent tactics and fire discipline they were able to effectively do so.

I'm aware of all this. And the controversy over Benteen, pro and con. And it's hard for me to take a firm position on whether or not Benteen's actions are reasonable or not given the circumstances he faced.



Thank you for Miles quote. I was not aware of it and now I will look further into it. But my general feeling about quotes like the one from Miles is that they can neither be dismissed nor accepted as gospel. On one hand the fact that Miles said it means it has to get serious consideration. On the other hand it's not at all hard to find two generals from any era (especially the Civil War era) who disagreed with each other. So just because Miles said it doesn't mean that it's so.



Understood. But, in my example given above of professional officers disagreeing, you could also probably get other modern combat arms officers to tour the battlefield who might disagree with Adelson. Adelson is plugging his book, after all.

Another simple example could be you and me. You've been there many times and I've been there twice. We've both seen and walked the ground and yet are coming to different ideas about how Custer used the ground and deployed his troops.



Yes, but I just love a good Custer discussion! Even if it's a Custer disagreement! Hopefully we can disagree without being disagreeable.



I strive to. I won't claim that I do but I strive to.



Custer was no coward. I don't doubt that he dies gallantly. But that doesn't mean that he might not have made some foolish, or at least imprudent, decisions that day.



"The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank."

There's the orders. I post them for further comment or discussion.



This would require a thread of it's own. Suffice it to say that points have been made pro and con about Reno the man and Reno's actions at LBH.



The fact that it's Libby Custer who is spending the rest of her life singing her husband's praises means that anything she says has to be scrutinized. She can hardly be considered objective.

He was by most accounts drunk on Reno Hill. He may or may not have been impaired earlier. I believe there is an eyewitness statement that says he took a pull from a flask before leading the attack into the valley? But I do believe there were conflicting statements about Reno's level of intoxication early on. The details of Reno's fight in the valley is one of the things on my list to dig further into. Most Custer books cover it in about one chapter. Recently a book came out dealing with just the valley fight and it looks to be a good one, albeit expensive:

Link: https://www.amazon.com/Where-Custer-Fight-Began-Undermanned/dp/0912783486/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1539889174&sr=1-1&keywords=reno%27s+valley+fight

It's on my list to acquire.

Edited: I can't get my link to work and I'm not sure why. But anyone interested can paste the link in or search Reno's Valley Fight. It really does look like a valuable book for the LBH obsessed.

Thank you!

Custer sent 2 messengers to Benteen telling him to come in support of Custer, Kanipe and the bugler Martin. Both got their messages to Benteen and he still didn't get there in time.







Of Course, one must remember to put aside personal preferences and look at facts. I am mostly interested in what happened more than personalities. Benteen was a fantastic soldier, capable beyond what most of his contemporaries were and I learned that after reading all the accounts from people that knew or corresponded with him. As a result, I have the greatest admiration for him as a soldier. The facts still show that two messengers told him of the urgency to come in support of Custer and he never made it.

Boston Custer was with the pack train at he time Benteen made it back to Reno Creek, and Boston made it back to Custer with plenty of time to die with him and Benteen didn't.



The quote is to validate from the perspective of a seasoned Indian fighter, that Custer wasn't incompetent, yet many revisionists still make that claim.




Steve didn't say that the officers agreed with him, he remarked how they were not at odds with Custer's handling of the battle. The link is just to show Steve has done considerable research himself on Custer and the battle, his perspective may not be consistent with mine, but he does know about the battle. This is used as reference only to avoid sounding like I am without resources.



This is more true of the Court of Inquiry as these guys testifying were coerced in many cases and also had recanted their versions of the battle 2 years after the fact. If you don't think there was a cover up, you need to read how those testimonials changed. That is why the version by George Herendeen is so poignant, he was a seasoned veteran scout form the 1874 expedition.

He had encountered the Sioux and Cheyenne when they left Bozeman in 1874 with the mission to stir up hostilities with the Indians to bring more forts to the Bozeman Trail. On that trip with less than 160 men, they fought the Sioux much of that time and even a skirmish or 2 with the Cheyenne and they made it back to Bozeman with only a couple casualties. He saved about a dozen troops down on the river when Reno retreated back onto the hilltop. He told them then, he had been in worse scrapes than this, and if they did what he told them he would get them to safety. He did just that.

That does indeed look like another book I have to acquire. If that makes me LBH-obsessed, so be it!

I raised the issue of Reno's intoxication has been raised a number of times by several authors, citing eyewitness reports. By those accounts, he started drinking immediately after receiving Custer's order to attack the southern end of the village, and he was observed drinking liquor from a bottle at several points during the fight.

This was of little import at the time, as histories of 19th century warfare show it was considered normal for officers to drink liquor before, during, and after battle. However: Reno's drinking was clearly beyond the pale, as related by surviving participants in the Valley Fight and the defense of Reno Hill. His conduct of the retreat from the valley to the trees and thereafter across the river appears to have been affected adversely by drink, and then on the hill Benteen was forced by circumstance to organize the defenses.