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Meade took a wild guess massed troops in the center July 3 outsmarted us jonnys 🤣

To quote Harry Truman, A school boy's hind sight, is always better than a general's foresight.

I can’t say wild guess. Deductive reasoning.
Meade held a counsel of war, at 8 pm in his headquarters. Each of his corps commanders, and most of the division commanders as well,
Everybody agreed that they held good positions. Stay here and “fight it out”.
There was nothing to be gained by attacking. Lee either had to attack tomorrow or withdraw from lack of supplies.
At the end of the meeting, Meade approached Gibbon, who commanded the Union Center of Cemetery Ridge.
“If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be on your front.”
Meade didn’t need a crystal ball. Lee had tried both flanks on the 2nd. Constantly pulling troops from the Yankee center to reinforce the flanks. If Meade was weak, it must be in the center.
Besides. Wilcox Had nearly captured it yesterday!
Ewells troops had actually captured some of the Yankees works on Culp’s Hill. They were supposed to attack before daylight, hopefully drawing even more troops from the Union center.
But the Yankees came back in the night, and forced Ewells guys out of their entrenchments, so the attack was never launched.
Now in the Civil War, artillery had one of two jobs. Either counter battery fire or counter force fire.
On attack, the idea was to knock out the defending cannon. On defense, artillery was focused on the enemy infantry. Explosive shot, shrapnel at first, switching to canister as they closed the range.
Hence, we had the great barrage, hoping to knock the Yankee guns out, of drive them away.
Trouble here is that your own powder smoke is gonna obscure your vision. You don’t know how effective your fire is, except by returning fire!

Such a clusterfuck so many advantages could have been exploited.Peg leg Ewell blew the wad day 1 but in his defense he won’t TJ Jackson😃

This is what brought on the great argument between Hancock, the infantry Commander and Hunt who was in charge of artillery, Hunt wanted to conserve ammunition for the infantry assault. Hancock, commanding infantry, realized how hard it was to receive a barrage, especially when your own artillery don’t fire back!
Hancock ordered the guns to fire, Hunt came by, minutes later, ordering them to cease fire. Sometimes the opposite. Hunt got there first, a few minutes later Hancock comes and tells you to shoot back!😀
This argument was carried on in the newspapers after the war! Who was right?
As a former soldier, I would want to hear my buddies shooting back, but hunt definitely had a point too 😀
We all know now how this story ends.
Damn shame that so many died, in defense of the union, or of states rights to govern themselves.
I’m a Yankee. Lived here in Pennsyltucky all my life. I belong here. These hills and ridges are my home. I believe it an honor to lay down my life in defense of my home and family.
That said, there’s definitely another side to this story, the right of the people to govern themselves, outside of Washington influence. That’s worth dying for too.
Screw Washington. I can be responsible for myself.
Reon

I wanted to go to Gettysburg this Saturday but it's going to be rain until 3 pm. My only hope is more of the afternoon will clear up between now and then

I’ll give two thumbs up 👍👍 to Alonzo Cushing even though he was a yanky

Directing his guns while holding his guts in with his other hand!

He was ordered to the rear but held his ground 👍

In Ewells defense on day one, even had Stonewall been there, taking Cemetery Hill or Culps Hill would have made Cemetery Ridge untenable for the Yankees. At that time, if you got your arty on a high point, you had the bad guys by the short hairs.
The strength of Meades position was those hills. If Lee could get possession, and set up a few guns,
Meade couldn’t hold his line.
But then he would’ve withdrawn to Pipe Creek. He would still have the inside track between Lee and Baltimore, Philadelphia, or Washington.
Maybe Lee could grab Harrisburg, the PA capital. But that would have meant a slight victory, he couldn’t hang on long.
He was a long way from his supply lines. He had to keep moving or he’d starve.
Meade and his commanders were well aware of this,
That’s why their consensus on 2 July was “stay here and fight it out”!
Reon

Peg Leg Ewell was suffering from a clumsily amputed leg less than a year previous which jagged bone end caused much pain (even over and above what a sawn-off leg would ordinarily cause).. and took a fall from his horse onto it that very day, which must have been excruciating.

But here’s a take on the end of Day 1 one rarely hears. From the book The Second Day at Gettysburg….

General Lee had sent a note to Ewell suggesting that he take Cemetery Hill “if practical”. Ewell studied the terrain and enemy from his perspective and decided it was not practical for a host of reasons.

One reason was that he had earlier received information that a considerable enemy force was approaching from the east. This threat prove to be true. Brigadier General Adolphus S Williams, in temporary command of the Union 12th Corps, was leading his division north using a rural lane connecting with the Hanover Road…

Williams two brigades, some 3700 men accompanied by 10 Napoleon cannons in two batteries, successfully gained Ewell’s left flank….. They formed two lines of battle… fronting west on either side of the Hanover Road.

Division commander Jubal Early decided the threat needed addressing…. “ I thought it proper to send General Gordon with his brigade to keep a lookout and…. stop any further alarm.”… soon thereafter, Ewell sent his last division under Edward Johnson, to relieve Gordon…

If Cemetery Hill was to be carried, Jubal Early’s men would have to do it. His division, however, was divided and had also suffered sizable losses. The brigades of Gordon and Smith were off to the east protecting the flank - a job normally tasked to cavalry, and the understrength brigades of Harry Hayes and Isaac Avery were disorganized and too small to do much of lasting value without additional coordinated support.

By 7 PM, it would have been very difficult to successfully organize and attack south against the reinforced heights without help from Anderson’s fresh division. Anderson, however, never received an order [from Lee] to advance that evening….

Fortunately for Ewell, General Slocum, commanding the Union right wing, ordered Williams not to engage….

Between 5 and 6 PM, when more Federals were streaming out of and around the town of Gettysburg than Confederates were entering it, many in Anderson’s division believed that one last all-out assault on the heights past town would secure a decisive victory.

No order to advance, however arrived…. While Ewell was evaluating his options for striking at Cemetery Hill, Anderson’s frustrated infantry went into bivouac on Herr’s Ridge.

Two questions.

1) What indeed would Jackson have done? When did he ever ignore a major enemy force on his flank?

2) Where was Lee? He had been on the field since riding up the Chambersburg Pike in the early afternoon. Why did he not send Anderson’s brigade in? They were right there observing the battle. Why not merely ride over to Ewell and evaluate the situation himself?

Good questions

Wasn't Ewell supposed to try and take Culps hill?

In the words of General Lee…. “if practicable”. The quoted passage explains why he did not. Most specifically, Union skirmishers had driven Confederate flankers off Benner’s Hill to Ewell’s left and a force of 3,700 Federals with ten cannons had arrived and set up shop on Ewell’s left flank, which would become his rear should he advance.

Also, Ewell was to take the hill “if practicable” but to “avoid bringing on a general engagement”. Without cavalry Lee, like Ewell, had no idea of the Federal disposition at this point.

A good description here…



Link



In essence Richard Ewell was in a no win scenario on July 1st. With no support from Lee, Longstreet, or Hill; Dick Ewell was expected to take a highly defensible hill, with poor avenues of advance, and even worse positions for his artillery.

Ewell also had to deal with unclear orders from Lee. In his official report, Lee stated, “General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy [Cemetery Hill], if he found it practicable….” It’s important to note that those words—“if practicable”—never appeared in print until Lee filed his revised report of the battle in January 1864, more than six months after the fight.

Lee went on to say; “Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.

General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were to hasten forward.” Unfortunately, in the years since the battle, much emphasis has been placed on the phrase “if practicable”—words that Lee may have never uttered in the heat of battle—and the warning about avoiding a general engagement has been ignored

I can only imagine the confusion that happened there. Surreal actually

In my humble opinion it was an elaborate risky endeavor that Lee took marching to Gettysburg. It was a long march. He had little support and tired men to fight with when he got there. I have read that when Picket marched in he could’ve taken the Union position because they were undermanned. His orders were not to engage. This gave the Union time to reinforce.

That comment came from the British tourist Arthur Fremantle, who accompanied the Army of Northern Virginia for two weeks before crossing the Union lines and traveling on to New York.

I see no reason to doubt his account. Lee being sidelined by shigella or dysentery during this critical time doesn’t seem like something his subordinates would include afterwards in their memoirs.

If he had come down with a severe case of the runs, that would explain much.

I’ve read that as well

Perry’s brigade to the left of Wilcox took cemetery ridge July 2 but didn’t have support would have been a fine time for Pickett to be behind them

When it comes to comparing Ewell vs Jackson, the link I posted emphases how Jackson placed a high emphasis on scouting out the deployments of the enemy before striking. It states that it was this very quality that led to his death, riding out in front of his own troops at Chambersburg on a reconnaissance mission and being shot by them on his return.