I have read that the US Navy under Kimmel wasn't responsible for providing air defense. Hawaiian air defense on 12/07/1941 was the responsibility of the US Army Air Corps under Short. The lack of a unified command allowed the ball to be dropped. I have also read that neither Kimmel, nor Short, had access to the information from the coded Japanese communications that the Navy�s ONI and the Army�s MI were reading. Again, the lack of a central authority for intelligence allowed opportunities to be missed.
I understand that McArthur�s original plan to defend the Philippines was to stockpile several months of supplies on Bataan Peninsula and to be build a defense in depth. Late in the game, McA decided to defend against the Japanese at the landing beaches even though he lacked air power, artillery, armor, and trained soldiers. Also, the USN submarine forces in the Philippines were employed hauling gold and US dollars out of Japan�s reach, rather than shooting torpedoes at the Japanese landing forces. Of course, once the Japanese bombed the Civite Naval Base, there might not have been replacement torpedoes or a means to load them into the submarines, so the effort might not have been worth the risk.
Jeff
