but then again Jackson would have been in Ewells position on day 1 and there wouldn’t be day 2 or 3 it would have been decided
Maybe. I believe detailed analysis has shown the situation at the end of Day 1 wasn’t so clear cut, in short Ewell not having as many men on hand and the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge already stronger than popularly supposed.
The buck of course stops with Lee and his vague orders toward that issue.
As far as disengaging and slipping around the Union left flank, way easier said than done. On Day 2 the ANV supply train and elements of its army were still strung out over more than thirty miles. To try and disengage would mean snaking the marching column around in close proximity to the main Union Army as well as colliding with large numbers of Union reinforcements rushing up from the south.
Thanks to the absence of Stuart no one in the ANV had any clear idea of where the Union forces were in relation to the area around the battlefield other than those gathering before them on Cemetery Ridge, hence Lee’s
that is where those people are and that is where I shall fight them or words to that effect.
Plus Confederate reconnaissance of the field the morning of Day 2 really sucked, even considering the circumstance. Even so, they nearly pulled it off.
