Home Forums Hunting & Shooting Hunter's Campfire Went to Gettysburg

I have been there several times. I would go back again if I were close. My trips to Gettysburg coincided with my trips to Ft. Indian Town Gap. Another place with a more recent history.

kwg

Had to have been a hell of a thing and most of them were just kids in their late teens early 20s

Was there last in 2018. Place was packed. A local guy said it used to be just the Summer, but lately it was three out of four seasons. The wife, who’s Chinese, couldn’t believe all the Chinese tourists. We did Little Round Top, The Virginia Monument, the PA Monument where I have family, the Tower, and the covered bridge on Marsh Creek. I used to park there and walk into the back side of my friend’s farm to hunt back in the 80s and early 90s. That creek split his farm into two. At the beginning of the movie Gettysburg, the scout Harrison rides through Marsh Creek. That fording spot is where we used to cross in warm weather, and right above where my brother and I overturned in a canoe one November. I had a deer stand in the woods the movie used at the start of Pickett’s charge.

Never realized The Gap was as big a deal as it is.
Googled after your comment.

I always thought it was just a training place for Pa Guard.

What if Jackson had been there instead of Ewell on day 1

Or what if Lee had listened to Longstreet and made the Feds attack an entrenched position

Civil War Artillery At Gettysburg . Another one that’s well worthwhile if you’re interested in Arty. I have this one on my nook. It gets into the nuts and bolts of the types of guns, and the gunners who served in the batteries.
To be honest, I don’t do much of the tourist type stuff. Anyplace I go on the Battlefield is special for me. I can close my eyes and hear the rattle of musketry and the thunder of the guns. I can smell the smoke and the sweat and the blood. I can see the gunners stuffing shot in the barrel and the infantry grappling with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Wifey has said that I may have died there. As Shelby Foote said, “the ground talks to you”.
Penny’s pretty new to it, I know the stories, I have the passion for the history, but I’m not polished enough for being a guide. The good ones can bring the story alive.
A couple years ago they had started a new Ranger Program called (I believe) The Face of The Battle. I guess maybe the damn Covid killed it, but it really should be brought back. You’d meet the Ranger at a certain spot at a certain time. They’d have a photo of a soldier, tell you things about him, where he was from, and then relate his experience of the battle. What he saw and felt. It put the thing on a very personal level.
They used to have a “Living History where re-enactors camped on the field and demonstrated weapons and tactics, and camp life. I missed it as well.
I sure hope these programs are not lost for good. It’d be a real shame if a damn bug no deadlier than the flu caused this to be lost as well.
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Totally different outcome. Ewell was hesitant and timid. Jackson would've put his foot on the Federals throat and kept it there. He would've pushed them right out of Gettysburg

Not trying to sound like a dick, but that statement shows that the fellow making it hasn’t studied the tactical situation leading to the battle.
Stonewall would not have hesitated taking Cemetery Hill or Culp’s Hill on 1 July.
But without either bill, the federal line would have been untenable. Southern artillery on either of those hills or Little Round Top could have driven away the Union Army.
But General Meade had already prepared for that possibility by laying out a defensive position at a place called Pipe’s Creek, 12 miles or so southeast of Gettysburg.
He actually planned the battle there. Only Hancock’s study of the terrain at Gettysburg and hisassurance that those positions could be held, changed Meade’s mind.
Lee would have held the town, but the Union Army would still be between him and Baltimore & Washington. He was still in enemy territory with no easy objective and damn little hope of resupply of the ammunition spent taking those now useless Hill’s.
Destruction of the opposing army was the only objective worthwhile for Lee. Maybe following Pete’s advice would have cut off Meade’s line of supply and communication, but taking the hils wouldn’t.
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Had Lee been able to get his Army between the Yankees and Washington or Baltimore, Meade would have been under political pressure to attack. That should have been Lee’s primary objective.
But truthfully, with no supply lines for food, he was forced to attack or keep moving. His army would starve by being stationary.
Meade was aware of this, but would Lincoln and the northern government allow him to wait Lee out?
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Maybe. A number of Historians have debated that very topic, IIRC the consensus being that the Army of Northern Virginia weren’t as potentially able, nor the Army of the Potomac potentially that vulnerable at the end of Day 1.

Here’s another take suggesting that just as the politically incorrect Longstreet was unfairly blamed for the outcome on Day 3, so an already deceased Dick Ewell made a convenient post-war scapegoat...

. http://emergingcivilwar.com/2011/10...heres-no-point-in-refighting-gettysburg/

Who’s responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg?

Lee, of course, on several levels. I do believe that worthy gentleman agreed with that analysis.

Interesting reading there, Mike. Thanks for posting it.
As much as I’ve been infatuated with Gettysburg, I’ve always thought that most people attach way too much importance to it. With Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, the die was already cast for the South’s defeat.
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Easier said than done when you have 70,000 men and their supply train still strung out over 25 miles, your largest body of men in close proximity to the enemy in a situation where disengaging to go around would invite a flank attack. Add to that, due to the absence or recent arrival of your cavalry, you still have no clear idea of the numbers and disposition of the considerable Union forces rushing to the battlefield at near-record pace.

Hence Lee’s ”the enemy is there and that is where I will fight him.”

0n Day 2 Lee, with outside lines, puts together a complex battle plan based on faulty reconnaissance where his troops are supposed to roll up the Union left flank beginning with what he believes would be an unoccupied Little Round Top, then through a likewise believed to be unoccupied Wheatfield/Peach Orchard.

This wasn’t supposed be a simultaneous attack, but was supposed to start at the Confederate right flank, each Confederate unit waiting until the unit to their own right had gone in before continuing the attack.

Thanks to the reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia right before the campaign, officers are working in close proximity for the first time, a few of whom despised each other. No one appears to be riding the whole Confederate line plugging gaps, coordinating attacks and clearing up confusion.

Despite all this they almost pull it off anyway, but on the Union side you have three highly competent Union Generals, Warren, Hancock and Hunt, constantly patrolling the Union line, coordinating movements and plugging gaps.

In particular Henry Hunt literally wrote the book on artillery tactics both sides were using, while on the Confederate side, Porter Alexander notwithstanding, the Confederate Artillery Commander was an elderly hack who owed his position to his friendship with Lee (I forget that’s guy’s name). Anyways thanks to that guy most of the Confederate artillery is held uselessly in reserve on Day 2.

IIRC

Harry Trueman quote, "A schoolboy's hindsight is always better than a general's foresight."

William N Pendleton was Lee’s chief of Artillery. Also, I believe, an Episcopalian preacher.
To be honest, though they had the same title, “Chief of Artillery”, the two jobs were completely different.
Pendleton was more or less a paper shuffler while Hunt’s position actually carried the authority to post guns as he felt they could do the most good. He also had the authority to call a ceasefire, as he famously did with the Second Corps Artillery during the artillery duel prior to Pickett’s Charge.
Hancock had his guns returning Rebel fire. He understood how demoralizing it is for troops to take a pounding from artillery and be unable to do anything about it. Hunt ordered the guns stopped, in order to save long range ammo for the coming Infantry assault.
In a few instances, as Hunt shut a battery down, Hancock came by minutes later ordering them to fire!
I’d love to have been a bystander to the argument between Hancock and McGivellry, as both men were legendarily adept at the use of profanity!
The opposing orders did cause a rift between Hunt and Hancock that spilled into the post war newspapers!
Pendleton’s job, by comparison had very little authority over the guns themselves. His was as a clerk requisitioning ammo and components of the batteries. To my knowledge, the only tactical decision he made at Gettysburg was to move away the 12 pounders that were supposed to move forward in support of Pickett and Pettygrew.
Pendleton is probably best remembered for his postwar attacks (along with Jubal Early) on Longstreet and the fictitious “Dawn Attack” on the second day that Longstreet postponed, lost the battle and the war for the confederacy.
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Very true

Day 3: Day two was a close thing, Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia was used to winning. Everybody knows how important this battle is to the Confederacy, the Rebs are pumped, ready to get it done.

Lee has two options; break off the action and lose the battle, end of the campaign, or try again to route the Union Army. Again unaware of the Union reinforcements brung in overnight.

Lee plans a full-court press all along the Union line to tie the opposition in place, sends JEB Stuart and 2,000 of his battle hardened cavalry to hit the Union line from the rear. Plans the largest artillery barrage of the war to break the Union center and then send in Pickett’s 12,000 fresh troops.

Lee customarily played his cards close to his vest, told his generals only what they needed to know, plus Lee was reportedly suffering from a bout of dysentery during the battle.

End result was of Lee’s 60,000 effectives still on hand, not counting his artillery only about 14,000 of these make any meaningful contribution on Day 3. Ironically the very volume of that artillery barrage works against them, the thick smoke on that still, humid day obscuring the fact they were shooting high, clear over the Union line. Otherwise thing might yet have turned out differently, the Confederates couldn’t catch a break that whole three days.

Again IIRC

Thanks for the clarification on Pendleton.

OTOH IIRC Longstreet DID delay the action on Day 2 for around three hours against Lee’s better judgement waiting for his favored (Alabama ??) shock troops to open the attack on the Union left. These men force marching about 25 miles on that hot day up the Chambersburg Pike road that morning before being thrown immediately into battle, with empty canteens.

Had the attack commenced even one hour earlier, General Warren never gets to scout out Little Round Top in the nick of time, Chaimberlaine’s Maine outfit and Strong Vincent’s NY men aren’t there yet to throw in anyway, and the first Minnesota wouldn’t be around in the nick of time to counterattack on Hancock’s order.

Hood’s men break through past the Round Tops and wreak havoc on the big Union artillery park and stores sitting on the other side, also blocking the road against the stream of incoming Union reinforcements.

Maybe the biggest “what if” in a battle full of “what if’s”.

Truth be told the order to invade Pennsylvania came from Jefferson Davis feeling the stress from the western frontiers Lees army had been whooping yankee ass and would have faired better doing so cutting off and defeating individual threats and consolidating as they did in the valley campaign

I agree. I have said for years that on the fateful day of 04 July 1863, the Confederacy failed to win the war at Gettysburg and lost the war at Vicksburg. My great-grandmother's brother was with the 13th Mississippi Infantry Regt., Barksdale's Brigade, Longstreet's Corps at Gettysburg. Another great-grandmother's brother was with the 43rd Mississippi Infantry Regt. at Vicksburg. My great-grandfather was with the 40th Alabama Infantry Regt., Moore's Brigade at Vicksburg. My wife's great-gr-grandfather was with the 39th Georgia Infantry Regt. at Vicksburg. My people saw a lot of history made on that fateful day.

This is true that the final approval for Lee to invade the north did come directly from Jefferson Davis. However, this was not a rash decision as there was a lot of debate whether to have Lee with the majority of his army stay in the area of northern Virginia, protecting Richmond and send Longstreet with his corps as quickly as possible to join with Johnston in Mississippi against Grant to break the siege of Vicksburg. Davis agonized over this choice. Lee was for invading the north and putting and end to the war, which, given his army's track record of defeating the Federals, was a sound proposition. The recent loss of Jackson was a serious blow to the Confederate command structure. However, it was not something that could not be overcome. Other competent officers were available. Maybe not quite as skilled as Jackson was, but this is war - Jackson is dead - you have got to move on. Lee had an army that was capable and accustomed to being victorious. The Federal Army of the Potomac's morale and confidence at that time was generally low. I can plainly see the logic in taking the offensive.

However, several in Davis' cabinet suggested holding the Federals in check north of Richmond and relieving Vicksburg, saving most of Louisiana,Texas, Arkansas, the Confederate Arizona Territory, and Indian Nations from being effectively cut off from the rest of the Confederacy. Meanwhile, Gen. Pemberton was holding on as best he could to Vicksburg that Grant had under siege. Johnston was massing troops as best he could from all parts of the southeast that could be spared in an effort to break the siege, but it was a near impossible task as none could be had from west bank of the Mississippi River that was then controlled by Federal forces. Gen. Bragg was reluctant to send Johnston any support and moving troops from the defenses of Mobile was unwise because the Federals by that time occupied both New Orleans and Pensacola, on the west and east flanks of Mobile, and were constantly threatening attack from either, or both. Johnston knew that he was facing overwhelming numbers and had to plan his attack on Grant carefully as he would have only one chance at it. Additionally, according to the last message that was received from Pemberton to Johnston via courier, he reported he estimated that he could hold out until mid-July. This was a miscalculation on Pemberton's part. The results were that Johnston was unable to assemble a force large enough to engage Grant and relieve the siege before Pemberton's army ran out of food and were too weak to fight their way out. They had plenty of arms and ammunition, but food had been exhausted. Johnston did not know the extent of the food shortage and was making his plans by his last communication with Pemberton.

So, this was the general situation. It was believed, incorrectly, that Vicksburg could hold out until it could be relieved with troops from the southeast. If Lee was successful, and he and his army had the track record of success, in defeating the Federals on northern soil and taking Baltimore, Philadelphia, and/or Washington itself, they could demand an end to the war and independence. If Lee had taken Washington, it would have made no difference what happened at Vicksburg. Remember, the Confederacy never had any intention whatsoever of conquering or destroying the United States government or it's cities, etc. They simply wanted their independence to govern themselves. They wanted out of what they believed had become a bad marriage, if you will. We can play countless hours of "woulda, coulda, shoulda", but that didn't happen. Looking back with 20/20 hindsight, if Lee had stayed in Virginia with most of his army and sent Longstreet with his corps to Mississippi and they, with Johnston and Pemberton's forces, had defeated Grant, that in itself would not have ended the war. However, Grant was on the verge of being relieved of command due to his past failures to take Vicksburg. I doubt his career as an army commander would have continued. Would at that point a frustrated U.S. government agree to peace? Maybe. Frankly, I don't know.

People in the north by that time were very weary of the war. They had recently lost several large eastern battles with horrendous casualties and had repeatedly failed to take Richmond. Now their great western army has been defeated. So now, what do the Confederates do militarily? Three possibilities as I see it: 1) send Longstreet's Corps back to Virginia?, 2) attack and retake New Orleans?, or 3) move north towards St. Louis?. My choice would be New Orleans. With the defeat of the western Federal army and the retaking of New Orleans, in my opinion, this would bring about foreign recognition of the Confederacy by England and France and most probably a peace treaty with the U.S. and independence. However, like I earlier said, that ain't what happened. 20/20 hindsight. It could easily have happened.

JMHO,YMMV