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Urrea is commonly credited by those who have studied the topic as being the best commander on either side during this short war. In fairness to the Texans tho it should be noted that he had the luxury of commanding men who followed orders.

Of Ward and King at Refugio, whose orders at that point had been to return to Goliad, John Linn later wrote "A difference of opinion arose between the two commanders in relation to the command, which seemed to be irreconcilable, as they could not be coerced into a concert of action, even by the perils that threatened them both so imminently.". One thing both men and their respective militias all had in common at that point was a desire to engage in combat, all had come to fight but thus far had seen precious little of it.

On the morning of the 14th of March, King took most of his own men and some of Ward's and set out on a strategically useless but probably personally gratifying strike at a Tejano camp some miles downriver, nine Tejanos were surprised and killed. Ward waited at Refugio but did send out a patrol to reconnoiter the area. All of the men of both parties were unaware of the catastrophe about to fall upon them.

Today one can hop in a car at San Antonio and easily see all these communities relevant to this campaign in a day, so it is easy to forget how empty and open the country was back then.

Urrea for his part was receiving a constant stream of intelligence but he wasn't omniscient, and the fog of war applied to him too.

It is a maxim of human nature that we tend to expect others to act in a similar way that we would. At the start of the campaign two weeks before, when he launched his preemptive strike on the Matamoras Expedition he had put himself 150 miles away from reinforcements with only a few hundred men at his back. At that point he was obliged to pause at San Patricio while the rest of his force caught up. Of course he was anticipating that Fannin on his part would likely strike back and reacted in a typically proactive manner.

From the account of Colonel Garay (who would later intervene to save a number of men at Goliad) with Urrea....

http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/goliadurrea.htm

On the night of the 7th, Jesus Cuéllar, known as el Comanche, presented himself in San Patricio claiming that he had abandoned Fannin's force to throw himself upon the clemency of the Mexican government.... He told General Urrea that Fannin had decided to attack him and that by this time he had probably effected a juncture with the force at the mission. Consequently he promised to take us to a spot where we could lay in ambush while he went and brought the enemy into our hands....

General Urrea, confiding in his sincerity, ordered 200 men, 1 cannon, and 150 cavalry to set out early in the morning of the 8th of March for Las Ratas, 8 leagues away, on the San Refugio road. When our destination was reached, Cuéllar left us and Gen. Urrea proceeded to arrange the small force to carry out his plan.

Eight leagues would be about twenty miles, more or less, and about thirty miles from Goliad.

The surprise would have been difficult in the location chosen, for the woods where we were to hide was extremely sparse and all the trees were dry and devoid of foliage. The enemy would have detected us long before its approach. Our front, left, and rear were immense plains with not even a blade of grass, while the creek was dry and so shallow that it did not cover the infantry placed in it.

Of course Fannin did not show, but this ambush episode had taken up 48 hours. On the morning of the 10th, the same day Fannin was receiving Ayer's request for assistance at Refugio, Urrea records that he received the following report...

March 10. I received news that the enemy had changed its plan and was making ready to march, with 400 men, to the aid of those who were besieged by our army in the fortress of the Alamo. I countermarched to San Patricio and ordered the cavalry to make ready to fight the enemy on the march.....

March 12. Our whole division set out, leaving a small detachment there.

So as of the 12th Urrea was on the move, intending to intercept Fannin and 400 men he believed were heading north to San Antonio. The following day, the same day Ward and 120 men were force-marching south to Refugio, Urrea recieved the follownig intelligence, and again reacted in his typically proactive manner... another all-night movement across an open plain in preparation for a surprise attack.

March 13. I marched towards Goliad and was informed enroute that the enemy had dispatched a strong detachment to occupy the port of Cópano and that they would halt at Refugio Mission.

It would be natural for an outside observer to assume that King, travelling towards Refugio with a train of empty wagons, shortly followed by Ward and 120 men, were on their way to the strategically vital port at Copano Bay. Certainly Refugio itself had little strategic value.

I dispatched a picket commanded by Captain Pretalia and thirty civilians headed by Don Guadalupe de los Santos with instructions for the first group to hold the enemy at the mission until I arrived with my division. I selected 100 mounted men and 180 infantry; and, with our four-pounder, continued the march during the night, leaving the rest of our troops encamped on the Aranzazu Creek.

In hindsight we know how things turned out and that Urrea would prevail handily against the outnumbered, disorganized and poorly-led Texians. For his own part Urrea preceded with an admirable balance of both initiative and caution. Hard not to give the guy credit even though he was on the wrong side.

But, from Urrea's perspective, he was advancing on unfamiliar ground into hostile territory, with the constant prospect of further enemy reinforcements arriving from the east.

On a different topic, much has been debated as to Urrea's brutality or lack thereof in association with the Goliad massacre. By his own report he had sent thirty men captured at San Patricio and Goliad to imprisonment at Matamoras rather than shoot them out of hand as ordered.

From Urrea's diary entry of March 16th, we learn that he WOULD shoot prisoners if he perceived it as necessary to the mission, and also how precarious he felt his own position was despite the 1,500 men by then at his disposal.

This from after his defeat of Ward and King at Refugio, when his next priority became to locate and engage Fannin at Goliad with all possible haste.

March 16. Leaving the wounded and the baggage under the care of Col. Rafael de la Vara, and instructing him to keep a watch on the port of Cópano, for which purpose I left the necessary guard, I marched with 200 men, infantry and cavalry, to Goliad, sending out scouts to reconnoiter the road to the town. The parties dispatched to pursue the enemy captured fourteen.

A messenger of Fannin was intercepted and we learned beyond all doubt that the enemy intended to abandon the fort at Goliad and concentrate its force at Victoria; that they only awaited the 200 men that had been sent to Refugio to execute this operation. On the 14th and 15th I had fought and dispersed the latter force.

In order to observe the enemy and cut off its communication with Victoria, I ordered Capt. Mariano Iraeta and sixty men to take a position on the road between that place and Goliad to watch it. I halted that night at San Nicolás.

The many hardships endured by my division, and the rigor of the climate that was felt particularly by the troops accustomed to one more mild, made my position extremely difficult because of the necessity of properly guarding the adventurers that I had taken prisoners. I constantly heard complaints, and I perceived the vexation of my troops. I received petitions from the officers asking me to comply with the orders of the general-in-chief and those of the supreme government regarding prisoners.

These complaints were more loud on this day, because, as our position was not improved, I found myself threatened from El Cópano, Goliad, and Victoria. I was obliged to move with rapidity in order to save my division and destroy the forces that threatened us.

Ward had escaped with 200 men; the infantry was very poor and found itself much affected by the climate. I was unable, therefore, to carry out the good intentions dictated by my feelings, and I was overcome by the difficult circumstances that surrounded me. I authorized the execution, after my departure from camp, of thirty adventurers taken prisoners during the previous engagements, setting free those who were colonists or Mexicans.

Birdwatcher