Fannin was in a real bind and folks then, as now, were quick to assign blame when things were tough.....

http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/ccbn/dewitt/goliadframe.htm

The signs of coming danger began to produce a feeling of anxiety, which was further increased by many vague and groundless rumors that circulated among the men.

The confinement in the garrison became irksome; our provisions, of which we had at first an abundance were becoming short; the restraints of discipline, now more necessary than ever in their enforcement, produced discontent and murmurs and a loss of confidence in their commander.

The practicability [or utility] of maintaining such forts, as it was in the wilderness, were fully discussed. Fannin was not slow to perceive the feeling coming over the men, and it caused a corresponding depression of his mind.


Leading Texians was never easy at the best of times and this was shaping up to be the worst of times. "Commanding Texians" would be too strong a term. Urrea had the luxury of command, no Texian leader ever did.

Fannin at that point bore the burden of knowing that he was THE game in town, nominal commander-in-chief of the largest extant Texian force then in the field, and personally responsible not only for the lives of his men but also for a virtual arsenal of cannon, small arms and ammunition that his employers had entrusted to him.

Worse, he had deployed 150 of those men, fully one-third of his force, on what turned out to be a fool's errand to Refugio and now could get no word from them.

So it must have seemed an act of providence when his cavalry unit, some twenty-eight men of yet another militia, the Mobile Grays under one Albert C. Horton, had returned from Victoria a short time before with a small train of ox-carts bearing food and supplies. After rationing the men for the retreat all they could not carry would be burned in place, but the ox-carts meant he now could potentially haul off those hundreds of extra muskets, at least some field pieces and the ammunition.

At least four successive messengers had been sent after King and Ward at Refugio but none had returned. One we know of, one of the Refugio Irish, had been captured by Garay's men and permitted to deliver his message to the besieged Ward inside the chapel. The other three almost certainly perished, intercepted along the way.

Finally Fannin dispatched one of those ubiquitous Scots, one Hugh MacDonald Frazer, late of Nova Scotia, one of the original Refugio Irish (ya, I know the contradiction). Frazer was one of those guys we wish we knew more about. He had been a leader of the Refugio Militia at the start of the war, and this time volunteered to go to Refugio after those four previous messengers had failed to return.

Almost certainly, based on passing mention in other survivor's accounts, Frazer took the logical step of contacting the local Tejanos around Refugio, with whom he was presumably still on friendly terms. By the evening of the 17th Frazer brought to Fannin the bad news about the events at Refugio and the size of the Mexican force now arrayed against him.

Bad news to be sure, but actionable intelligence at last.

As an aside, the ultimate fate of Frazer is unknown. Presumably he was captured with the rest of Fannin's force near Coleto Creek. Family tradition had it that he was executed at Goliad in the massacre but nobody knows for sure. Prior settlers like Frazer, personally known to their Tejano neighbors to be good people, were saved on at least some occasions. A Hugh MacDonald Frazer would be present a month later at San Jacinto, it may have been the same guy.

Birdwatcher


"...if the gentlemen of Virginia shall send us a dozen of their sons, we would take great care in their education, instruct them in all we know, and make men of them." Canasatego 1744