Home Forums Hunting & Shooting Hunter's Campfire Captain Thomas Weir, 7th Cavalry

The year before the LBH. The seventh Calvary had been issued 15 rounds each trooper for target practice.

Custer divided his forces 15 miles from the village.

Benteen was sent on a “ wild goose chase” as Windolph later states. He had 3 company’s DH& K 110 troopers no scouts. ( just over 19 % of the force). He finally abandoned his mission and flanked his troop towards Custers trail.

Lt. McDougall had B company{ (127 troop and 7 scouts) 21.5 % of the force}. This group brought the pack train and guarded it. Only 18 of the mules were reported to have had any actual packing experience before the expedition. Out of the 140 mules that started 97 were left. They stayed 1/2 an hour back and used the scouts to attempt to maintain visibility. This pack train was struggling to complete its mission.

Reno had 140 men . Companies A,G,M. He also had 35 scouts. ( 23.4 % of the force)

Custer had 213 men ( 5 companies C,E,F,I,L ) and 8 scouts. (35.6% of the force)

When Reno got to the river the horses were allowed to drink. They were extremely thirsty and gorged on the cold water. ( The effects of this massive water intake affected the horse’s ability to “ charge!”.) The charge spread out, many horses fell back. During the charge several women and children were killed. Deeds, a young Santa arc youth was perhaps the first. Cheif gall lost two squaws and several children.

Then Reno approached the camp. The scouts failed to disperse the Indians pony herd, and one of every 4 trooper held the horses while the other 3 formed a skirmish line. That gave Reno about 95 carbines. ( should have been 105?) But some had fallen out of the charge, or failed to stop……running into the hostile camp.The line was about 130 yards wide. The valley was 800 yards wide in areas. They deployed civil war tactics ( not actually aiming at targets) most bullets whizzed over the Indians. The bullets would smash into the tops of the tipi poles. The amount of dust riled up decreased visibility to under 50 feet in places. Lt. Varnum later stated that many troopers were “ shooting right up in the air.” Lt . Varnum estimated 400 - 500 Indians approaching.The village was perhaps 400 yards away.

The skirmish line was failing, the Indians were closing in. Reno could see Custer waving his hat…….Custer was over 2 miles away! He was not approaching…..but rather riding further away. Custer was heading to what he believed to be an easy way into camp. ( Weir point). It was a dead end. Reno was under the assumption That Custer would have been engaged by now. Reno was supposed to be the anvil, Custer the hammer. But the hammer was easily 40 minutes away and riding further away!

Reno retracted into some timber for cover, the Indians began starting fires, finally Reno had a frantic retreat.

He chose to retreat towards the last place he saw Custer. However the banks of the big horn was not conducive to crossing there. Many of his troop perished retreating. Out of 140 men 13 were wounded, 57 were missing. They had formed the skirmish line at about 1515…,..were retreated to Reno hill at 1610.

American horse, an Oglala Lakota stated ‘ was like chasing buffalo, a grand chase’ ‘ The Indians kept killing soldiers right along.’ One Indian stated he didn’t remember any fire by the soldiers upon their retreat. Many soldiers were tomahawked in the river.

Custer released his scouts and sent at least one message back. But I don’t really have an opinion how exactly he met his demise. Perhaps he believed he was not detected and rode into a trap.

But I believe that they sorely missed their sabers, and should have kept their horses/mules in better shape. This would have provided more ammunition, and the ability to use more Calvary maneuvers .Lack of sabers emboldened the enemy and limited the soldiers ability to attack on horseback and defend themselves. When using skirmish lines they should have been trained to apply direct fire.

Certainly Benteen had a valid question to Custer “ Shouldn’t we keep the command together?” When Custer decided to split up 15 miles from the enemy.

.
One of the factors driving Custer's decisions at LBH was very likely his success at the Battle of Washita River.
687 troopers vs. perhaps 1800 warriors. Washita happened in cold weather, surprise was in favor of the troopers and by reports, the Indians didn't or couldn't get deployed in strength.

So at LBH, Custer had worse odds (numbers), surprise was lost and the Indians were able to counter-attack more efficiently, by reports.
Then factor in the poor terrain in which to form a good defense.

Seems like Washita was an anomaly and not an event that future planning should be based on.
Although the capturing of non-combatants was one element that might have worked at LBH but so many other factors stood in the way of accomplishing that at LBH.

It was Lt Edgerly who was having trouble getting mounted on a shying horse. Sanders, his orderly was grinning at him, later he told Edgerly he couldn’t help but laugh as the Indians repeatedly missed from 20’paces!
Custer hadn’t planned on attacking the 25th.
His original plan was to close the distance and reconnoiter the village, giving the men and horses time to rest up and hit them first thing after daylight on the 26th.
But he was afraid he’d been discovered by the Sioux and rushed the assault, fearing they’d all run off.
Actually we now know that the Sioux and Cheyenne had been monitoring both the Dakota Column and Gibbon’s Montana column all along from the get go!
Reon

I thought I read that Custer could have taken repeating riffles. But choose not to. The Indians did have some ?

Some cavalry members had repeaters that were privately owned, but for the most part everyone had the 1873 Springfield.
As I said in an earlier post, it’s estimated that about half the Indians had firearms of one type or another.
By the second day of the siege on Reno Hill, most commanders had restricted firing to only the best marksmen. They were trying to conserve ammo.
Reon

The long s ⟨ſ⟩ uſage will make for intereſting reading. . . .

An account of the remarkable occurrences in the life and travels of Colonel James Smith (Late a citizen of Bourbon County, Kentucky) : during his captivity with the Indians, in the years 1755,'56, '57, '58, & '59

https://ia804705.us.archive.org/9/items/accountofremarka00smit/accountofremarka00smit.pdf

Both Reno, Benteen and much of the 7th were raging alcoholics. If Custer had his Michigan Wolverines he may have won.

This would have changed the outcome considerably.




The forensics of the battlefield suggest the Indians had around 300 firearms, not all of which were repeating rifles. The misconception of repeaters giving the Indians an advantage is over emphasized. The 45-55 Cavalry carbines were chosen over repeating rifles for several reasons. In a skirmish line, even as a single shot, the firing was fierce enough to overcome the lack of a repeater. The 45-55 was also a much longer range and lethal round than a Henry or 1866 Winchester had with a 44 Rimfire cartridge. The 405 grain slug was also capable of putting down a horse, where a 44 Rimfire was not. (Keogh’s horse, Comanche, sustained and survived with around 11 small arms wounds) Although there were some copper cases that did stick in the hot chambers of the Springfield carbines, it was not nearly the failure rate most people think existed.

Had the 45-55 been so inferior, Reno and Benteen wouldn’t have been able to protect their defensive site against the same mass of Indians that defeated Custer and sent Reno to the hilltop.

Sabers were left and would have little effect on the Indians as there was little or no hand to hand or horse to horse combat that a Sabre would have been effective. Troopers were issued 60 rounds of carbine ammunition and 24 rounds of revolver ammunition on their horse. In a fire fight like the LBH, that amount of ammunition wouldn’t last long, hence Custer’s urgency to get Benteen and packs to be brought in support.


There was no choice made by Custer to take the 45-55 carbines to the Little Bighorn. Those guns were issued by the Army. Custer did have repeating Spencers during the Civil War with the Michigan Wolverines.

What do you think was the main reason for the overwhelming defeat of the 7th ?

I believe you need to blame the Indians, not Custer.

All the armchair quarterbacks blame Custer’s arrogance, lack of reconnaissance, dividing his force, not waiting until the 26th, not taking sabres or Gatling guns, not listening to his scouts, and various other reasons that they want to throw at Custer.

All those points have been thoroughly discussed and few will put them into the context of what happened and how any or all of the points are valid.

I think Custer is a misunderstood individual with incredible cavalry skills and he showed it time after time during the Civil War. He also had more contact and conflicts with Indians than LBH and Washita.

This is where most detractors start to fall apart, as they have little understanding of the plains Indian wars in the 19th century. Custer was all over the West, Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma with the 7th Cavalry for many years after the Civil War.

He led expeditions into the Black Hills and along the Yellowstone when they were surveying for the railroad. He had more than couple conflicts or just contact with plains Indians and was one of their biggest allies as he testified against President Grant’s brother and Secretary of War William Belknap and how they mishandled Indian affairs and kickbacks from trading posts on the frontier.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trader_post_scandal

When Custer, with all his experience and background, made his decision to attack the village as he did, he wasn’t intentionally risking all of his command to become victims of the Indians. Everyone commenting on how he was wrong, is using post battle views of the entire engagement and making 21st century commentary with little understanding of all the other factors that were in place in 1876.

Reno’s attack on the village was to make the Indians focus on that attack, to allow Custer to continue down the river to strike the village from the east and capture non combatants and control the Indians and the battlefield. Counting on Reno to do that and expecting a much quicker response from Benteen, Custer certainly figured he could be victorious.

Reno didn’t, Benteen didn’t and 1500 warriors overwhelmed Custer and drove Reno to the bluffs to escape total annihilation. The battlefield covers nearly 5 miles from one end to the other and 660 men spread out on unfamiliar terrain that was not defensible, was too much to control.

A gathering of this size was never seen before or since. Reservation agents indicated there were less Indians off the reservations than there actually were, leading to poor intelligence in regards to how many Indians could possibly be off reservations. Seeing the location of the village from the Crows Nest early on June 25, was only a view of the Indian ponies in the plains beyond the village, not the village itself.

It is continually said that his scouts told him that too many Indians were on the river and Custer attacked anyhow. Analyzing the existence of the Indians, the fact that Custer had been discovered by the Indians and that the urgency to strike the village before they could scatter, made Custer realize he was to attack sooner than later.

You also have to realize, Benteen thought he had been sent on an oblique to keep him from participating in the battle and keep him from getting any glory of the win. This tells you that even Benteen, who had stated earlier to keep the command intact, still figured Custer was capable of a victorious battle even with smaller numbers.

At the end of the day, Custer and his immediate command were dead, the remaining 7th cavalry was in shock and soon enough America learned that one of most successful Civil War heroes had died at the hands of plains Indians. Today, many people criticize Custer, with little understanding of the time and place he occupied in American history. Reno never recovered from his poor image as a cavalry officer, was dismissed from the Army with a less than honorable discharge and died a broken man. His family played the 20th century tactics of revisionist historians and had his discharge posthumously changed to honorable.

Many the accounts at Reno’s Court Of Inquiry were coerced and made to favor the survivors of the battle and in light of Custer not making it to that court, he became the goat and got blamed for how everything failed.

To answer the original question, there were too many Indians..

1) He misjudged the enemy's combat power.
2) As the enemy combat power was brought to bear, he was out-maneuvered.

Just finished up with Donavan’s “Terrible Glory” again. Probably the 5th or 6th time I’ve read it.
It’s the book that introduced me to the General and LBH probably 15 years ago.
I said before, I grew up in the 70s and 80s, and I had a pretty negative view of Custer and his place in history.
As often happens in American history for me, the book piqued my interest, and I wanted to learn more. After all, it’s a fascinating story😀!
Since then I e read everything I could get my hands on, and the more I read, the more I came to admire the General and realize that it wasn’t just the redskins that slew him, but his own officers under and above him that sacrificed him, his men, and his reputation in order to save their own hides!!!🤬
You’re all welcome to your own opinions. That’s one of the many reasons I love being an American. It’s a basic American right to form an opinion on something, even if you don’t know WTF you’re talking about!😀
If However, you wish to inform yourself, and possibly gain another hero to admire, Donavan’s a great place to start, and I’m sure many of us could recommend dozens of other!
Reon

Nathaniel Philbrick wrote “Last Stand” at the same Tim Donovan wrote his book. Both well researched and documented. As earlier stated, all these books are books written after reading other Books.

William Graham wrote “Custer Myth” in the 1920’s. Graham actually conversed a lot with Benteen, years after the battle. He also interviewed many survivors and put together one of the best books you can find about Custer and the battle.

There are hundreds of Custer related books out there it is best to find and stick with the knowledgeable authors. Mike Donahue who is a battlefield interpreter, also wrote a book worth reading and is considered the best authority on the battle today. “Where The Rivers Ran Red”

https://laststand.com/products/where-the-rivers-ran-red

And be sure to ignore what the Indians said.

Osky

Yeah, I know we’ve traveled this road many times over the years!😀 I have enjoyed each trip, because I’ve found some great guides on the fire, and each trip teaches me more!
I read Philbrick and Connell many times as well and quite a few others. Also read some of the things about the Reno Inquiry too. It was a whitewash, and The General got massacred again.😟
Like I said, I got fascinated with Custer and The Alamo story as well.
I find the whole sordid soap opera of what happened and what should’ve happened, all the loose threads that beg a person to start tugging!😀
I got to Gettysburg and Antietam a lot, and I know the history well. Both places haunt me, and both my spouses said they thought maybe I died there! The passion I have for those places always comes to the surface!
I really need to get back to Montana and San Antonio so I can maybe die there as well!😀
Reon

Shrapnel: Don’t you think Custer should have known that Reno wasn’t the best choice he had for such a crucial assignment? Why would he have not given that job to Benteen or Tom Custer. The failure of Reno’s diversionary attack allowed the Indians free rein to concentrate on Custer which is exactly what Reno was to prevent.

Those pictured bluffs are where the Crow scouts located the Sioux and are to the southeast of "Lone tepee" marked on Camp's map? Interesting seeing what things actually look like compared to a map.

I was actually thinking about this the other day. The only reason I could think for not sending benteen to attack was that would leave Reno to take the scout to the southwest. Reno had a similar mission earlier along the rosebud, and didn't do too well. Maybe Custer trusted him more with the attack.

There are 2 ways to look at Indian testimonials: they lied, or they told the truth.

Many Indian eyewitness accounts have been analyzed and found to be valuable. Some are totally unreliable. Sitting Bull was no fan of whites or their encroachment on Indian territory. Few people are aware of the first known encounter with the cavalry protecting the survey party along the Yellowstone.

A cavalry captain was on the Yellowstone with his troops assigned to protect the survey party and the Indians tried to lure him into an ambush. Knowing better, he was not deceived and ended up in a parlay with Sitting Bull and his Sioux warriors. Sitting Bull stood up in the middle of the meeting, announced that he represented the 7 Sioux tribes and he was declaring war on the United States.

How he ever overcame his distaste for whites enough to become part of Buffalo Bill’s Wild West show, I will never never understand.

There were plenty Indian survivors who have been asked and quoted about their involvement on the Little Bighorn and their accounts have helped build a fairly decent concept of how the battle proceeded.

However, you need to be cautious around the 4 Aces Saloon in Hardin, as most of those Indians lie a lot…

Here is a view from the top of those bluffs, looking back toward the Crow’s Nest and down on Reno Creek. The tree line in the center of the picture that continues from left to right is Reno creek, where Custer sent Reno to follow the fleeing Indians toward the Little Bighorn. There is a knoll in the right center of the picture where Custer’s scout, Girrard was when he saw the band of about 18-20 Indians that took off toward the Little Bighorn. In my view, I see this as the very beginning of the “Last Stand..