Home Forums Hunting & Shooting Hunter's Campfire Understanding The Civil War More Clearly

I was blown away recently to read that, during stalemate at Petersburg in late 1864 the Army if Northern Virginia was blowing off 37,000 rifle-musket rounds per day. This from an army on its last legs.

At Gettysburg an estimated 1.5 million small arms rounds fired off by each side during the three day battle. As I understand it, all those paper or linen cartridges were rolled mostly by hand by someone, somewhere. I can find no estimate of cannon ammunition fired except estimates of somewhere in excess of 2,000 rounds.

We generally talk of armies moving this way and that, represented by arrows on the maps, without considering the enormous logistics necessary to make that happen....

http://columbiadailyherald.com/sections/opinion/columns/moving-army-civil-war-logistics.html

It is an axiom in the military — amateurs study tactics while professionals study supply.

At this point in 1862 the army commanders of both the Union and Confederate forces were just coming to grips with the problems of maintaining an army on campaign. Think of how much a teenager, or a young 20-something can eat. Multiply that amount by three times a day, and again by 30 days in a month. Then multiply it again by thousands, then tens of thousands. That is the amount of food needed. Add in the needed extra clothes, arms, equipment, ammunition, buttons, tents, sewing needles, buckles, bayonets, beer, boots and blankets.

All of this material, bought from a thousand suppliers in thousands of places, had to be shipped, accumulated, sorted, and distributed to the troops. Ships and trains carried the goods. Thousands of men were needed to load the ships and trains. Thousands more were needed to unload the ships and trains, and then repack it all into army wagons to be carried along with the armies. Hundreds and thousands of wagons pulled by mules and horses; hungry mules and horses. They have to eat, too — and fodder is a bulky load. More wagons and mules were needed just to haul the fodder. The farther the army got from its railhead, the more transportation it required. At 10 miles from the railhead supply problems became difficult, at 25 miles men and mules were hungry, and at 50 miles they began to starve.

And what of the sick and wounded? They had to be transported to the rear, hopefully to a hospital. Wounded horses and mules were simply put out of their misery, but disabled men had to be moved. More wagons, more mules, more fodder, more men, more food. More, more, more. Civil War armies had a huge logistical “tail” that reached all the way back to its sources. This tail had to be protected at all costs, and this took even more men — and wagons — and mules.

Take a look at just about any map showing the major battles fought during the Civil War. Nearly all were fought within a few miles of a railroad or a navigable water way. The strategy and tactics of the Civil War took a backseat to the logistics that fed the armies. Often mules were more important than generals.

What amazes me they could pull all this off in an age of pen-and-ink communication.

Birdwatcher